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INTRODUCTION
In June of 1983, Governor Dukakis formed the Commission
on the Future of Nature Industries. In so doing, he asked a
statewide cross section of leadership from business, labor,
economics, and local government to join with senior members
of his administration and key legislators to address one of
the most important problems facing this state's economic
future: the condition of our traditional manufacturing
industries.
The Commission has recognized from the outset the
limitations on the state's role in this area. Most economic
decisions that affect the availability of jobs in
Massachusetts are made in the private sector, and without
question that reality should and will continue. That the
marketplace has generally served us well is evident in the
favorable statewide indicators of growth in -jobs and personal
income. Businesses have weighed the strengths of our
Commonwealth against its weaknesses and more often than not
bet on the former.
It is equally true that to the extent our state's
economy is affected by public decisions, the most sweeping of
those are made at the federal level, and not here in
Massachusetts
.
But recent experience has shown that there is a
constructive and important role for the Commonwealth to play
in the deployment of its own economic resources. Used
wisely, our programs of business assistance and finance,
education and training, infrastructure and capital formation
can reinforce the strengths of our state's economy and
cushion some of its weaknesses.
We must begin with an understanding of what the
Massachusetts economy looks like on paper and feels like in
the regions and communities that depend on it. In popular
imagery—and in fact—Massachusetts is a unique product of
two industrial revolutions: the one that built the mills of
the nineteenth century, and the one that built the high
technology companies of today. We are the leading technology
state in America, yet we still represent in national economic
debate the problems of the mature industrial northeast. That
diversity is a great advantage.
In fact, our blend of mature industries and high
technology, when coupled with a robust and expansive service
sector, has enabled Massachusetts to weather the recession of
the early 1980 's and to emerge into a period of renewed
economic growth.
Why, then, should we focus on the problems of mature
industries? First and foremost, these industries remain a
major source of jobs for our people. Of the approximately
one-third of our workforce that is engaged in manufacturing,
fully 60% are employed in what we have come to call "mature
industries"—over 400,000 jobs in all.
Unlike the service and technology sectors, mature
industries lost jobs during the recent recession
—
just as
they have lost jobs, in the aggregate, since the Depression
and World War II. Yet we simply cannot "write off" our older
manufacturing base and assume that our state will make a
smooth and humane transitiion to a computer-based future. In
older industrial areas, like southeastern Massachusetts, or
the Blackstone Valley, or the "northern tier" that extends
from North Adams to Gardner, unemployment is often double the
statewide average, the knowledge-based economic future has
barely begun to take root, and the costs to families and
communities of a mature industrial collapse would be
immeasurable.
We do not believe that has to happen. For one thing,
our mature industries are not uniformly in decline. All over
Massachusetts, individual manufacturers of hand tools,
industrial machines, paper, shoes, apparel, plastics,
abrasives, and other basic goods are quietly going about the
business of modernizing, reinvesting, restructuring, and
surviving. In short, they are viable.
Moreover, with appropriate public and private
cooperation, significant segments of an industry may find
that they have a future. Our food industry—surely our
oldest— is an example. With the 200-mile limit to back them
up and new infrastructure to support them, the Boston,
Gloucester, New Bedford, and Cape Cod fishing fleets have
turned decline into growth. The land-slide fish processing
industry has seen a wave of new investment and new jobs.
Other food manufacturers have also reinvested. The West Lynn
Creamery has expanded five times in a decade. H.P. Hood has
decided to stay in Charlestown and modernize, with public
help, its corporate headquarters and main dairy facility.
Ocean Spray has grown dramatically in Plymouth County.
Yet it is equally true that whole industrial segments,
and dozens of firms within them, are losing ground inevitably
to the realities of changing market conditions or failing
management. This Commission does not want to "prop up
losers" or "save the dinosaurs."
The Governor asked us to take a balanced approach;
specifically, we were directed to explore four areas of
concern:
1. How can public and private resources be used
to help healthy industries modernize and grow?
2. How can the plight of troubled firms be
addressed more effectively—particularly in
that critical minority of cases in which a
viable business and the jobs it provides can
legitimately be saved?
3. How can we better cushion the impact on
workers, families, and communities when plant
closings and other major dislocations of
employment truly must occur?
4. How can the state, within recognized limits,
help guide the on-going transition in our
economy, especially in those older industrial
regions where the combination of rapid decline
in mature industries and slow growth in high
technology could inflict the most severe
social and economic costs?
The work of the Commission, and the recommendations it
hereby presents to the Governor, are based on these four
concerns.
In the course of the Commission's deliberations, three
general propositions have become apparent to the members.
First, the deeply emotional issue of plant closings has
proven to be, in quantitative terms, a relatively minor one
—
"a small problem in search of a small solution," as one
member put it. But plant closings are devastating events in
the lives of the families and communities they impact, and
the struggle to find a public policy remedy has long been a
barrier to more comprehensive thinking about mature
industrial problems. In offering a negotiated solution to
the plant closing issue, the Commission feels it has made a
valuable contribution to a much broader agenda as well.
Second, we have learned that the demarcation between
"mature industries" and "high technology" is fuzzy at best,
and good public policies will recognize that reality. Many
"mature industrial" firms will survive and grow by
diversifying into new high-technology product lines, becoming
suppliers for high-tech companies, adopting computer-based
manufacturing processes when they modernize, or all of the
above. General Electric/Pittsfield's new research and
development venture in polymer plastics, and Morelli Shoe
Company's installation of computer-operated assembly lines in
its New Bedford plant, represent very different examples of
this point.
And third, Massachusetts should not lose sight of the
fact that it already does more than most states to assist
companies through specialized finance, site preparation, and
training programs. While we have identified a few modest
unfilled needs and recommended steps to meet them, much of
what needs to be done involves better coordination and focus
of our existing array of tools.
The Commission's work is in many ways only a beginning.
Larger issues of maximizing industrial growth and industrial
equity in Massachusetts remain. All of us look toward a
Massachusetts economy that comes closer to full employment
than is now the case; that provides higher wages to more of
its workers; and that better distributes the fruits of growth
and change among all regions of the state.
In the collaboration of the men and women who comprised
this Commission and of the divergent interests they
represent, we have laid a good foundation.
THE COMMISSION AND ITS WORK
STRUCTURE OF THE COMMISSION
The Commission's membership included 38 representatives
of the business, government, labor and academic communities.
The diversity of this group's interests and perspectives and
the willingness of its members to work together toward common
goals, speaks well for the Commonwealth's ability to address
important economic issues.
The Commission began its work in the summer of 1983 with
hearings in Framingham and Springfield. The Commission then
broke down into three committees mandated in its charge from
the Governor: the Industry Analysis Committee, which
analyzed factors affecting businesses in mature industries;
the Labor Market Policies Committee which examined employment
and training issues affecting workers and firms in mature
industries; and the Worker and Community Assistance
Committee, which considered what could be done to prevent the
closing of viable businesses and to minimize the impact on
workers and communities when business closings are
inevitable.
The Commission and its subgroups met over 30 times.
Research work involved the integration of existing data on
the state's economy, as well as some original data creation
and analysis. Analytic work was supplemented by interviews
with companies, labor leaders, educational institutions,
members of the banking and finance industries, and officials
of state and local government.
DEFINING MATURE INDUSTRIES
There are several ways to define "mature industries"
—
ranging from the chronological (the age of the industry) to
the economic (characteristics of their end-use markets) to
the technological (their level of research and development
expenditures) • The Commission's definition was simply all
non-high technology manufacturing firms.
This somewhat arbitrary definition includes the
following industries: food processing, lumber and wood
products, furniture and fixtures, paper, printing and
publishing, apparel, textiles, shoes and other leather
products, chemicals, rubber and plastics, primary metal
production, miscellaneous manufacturing (such as toys and
sporting goods), some fabricated metal products (e.g.,
cutlery and handtools) , some non-electrical machinery (e.g.,
engines and metalworking machinery), and some electrical
machinery (e.g., household appliances). These traditional
manufacturing industries directly represent 60% of all
manufacturing jobs and 15% of total statewide employment.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The Commission addressed a broad range of issues through
its three main committees. Several findings emerged:
• Characteristics of mature industries
- Although they have declined as a source of
jobs, mature industries remain critical to
the economic base of several regions of the
state and to important parts of the state's
workforce.
- Mature industries face a number of chal-
lenges to their competitive environment,
ranging from new sources of international
competition to new generations of technol-
ogy to shifting market demands.
- Some industries have already gone through
major shakeouts; others will continue to
decline.
• Characteristics and costs of plants which have
closed
- A total of 67 facilities employing 12,368
people closed in Massachusetts between
January 1982 and December 1, 1983. The
industries accounting for large numbers of
closings include apparel, shoes, and elec-
trical and electronic machinery.
- While plant closings are not presently a
major statewide problem, some areas of the
state (Gardner, Clinton, and New Bedford)
were hit particularly hard. Such communi-
ties find it extremely difficult to
rebuild their economic bases.
- Approximately 44% of the workers affected
by these closings got less than one month's
notice.
- It is often difficult for workers affected
by closings to find new jobs comparable
to the ones they have lost.
- Maintaining health care coverage was a par-
ticular concern of these workers.
• Business strategies of successful firms in
mature industries
- Companies have integrated "high tech" into
their businesses through developing
products for high technology markets,
integrating high tech equipment into their
manufacturing processes, and using new high
technology materials as inputs.
- Firms have identified business "niches"
which are shielded from international com-
petition, which can be dominated by small
companies, and in which quality and service
are more important than price.
- Well-managed companies have modernized
their plant and equipment during periods of
favorable business conditions.
- Many firms have also invested in new
products and processes to keep up with
market changes and competition.
• State efforts to assist firms and workers
- While much is currently being done in the
areas of worker training and finance, more
progress must be made to address the
special concerns of workers and firms in
mature industries.
- A better understanding of dislocated workers
and their needs is essential; it is clear
that existing federal commitments are not
sufficient to address this.
- The state offers an unparalleled array of
financing programs, aimed primarily at
growing firms. However, there is no capa-
bility to fund new product development in
traditional industries. In addition, our
existing financing programs are not gener-
ally equipped to help restructure troubled
but potentially viable firms.
From these findings emerge four major needs which the
Commission's recommendations are designed to address:
• Helping viable businesses to modernize and grow
• Addressing the problems of troubled firms
• Cushioning the impact of plant closings on
workers and communities; and
• Guiding a mature industrial economy in
transition.
ORGANIZATION OF THIS REPORT
This report presents the findings and recommendations of
the Commission. Much of the research work is included in the
appendices. While the report draws heavily on them, they
should be consulted for more detailed analysis of specific
topics.
The report itself begins with a discussion on the
decline of many mature industries, highlighting the special
role they continue to play in the state's economy ("The
Changing Massachusetts Economy and The Importance of Nature
Industries") • The next chapter discusses some of the reasons
mature industries are in decline ("Why Industries Decline:
Factors Affecting Nature Industries") • The following chapter
discusses how companies in mature industries have been able
to succeed ("Growing Firms In Nature Industries: What
Businesses Do To Succeed") • The fourth chapter considers the
magnitude and impact of plant closings ("The Costs of
Transition: Plant Closings and Nass Layoffs in
Nassachusetts") • The fifth chapter presents an overview of
existing state programs to assist workers and industries,
identifying ways in which they can be improved ("State
Efforts To Assist Workers and Industry") . The final chapter
of the report presents the Commission's recommendations.
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THE CHANGING MASSACHUSETTS ECONOMY AND THE IMPORTANCE OF
MATURE INDUSTRIES
In the aggregate, our mature manufacturing industries
are in decline. In Massachusetts they represented
approximately 35% of the state's jobs in 1950 and 15% in
1983, a drop of over 200,000 jobs. Growth in high technology
industries, and in the service, finance, and trade sectors
have provided new employment opportunities for the state
(Exhibit 1) • Yet this growth has not been able to fully
compensate for the special roles mature industries play in
the Commonwealth. (Appendix A, "The Massachusetts Economy
and Mature Industries," expands upon the analysis presented
here.)
Statewide statistics paint a prosperous picture of the
Commonwealth when compared to the rest of the nation. The
state's per capita income is above the national average
and since 1978 the unemployment rate has been lower (although
still high by historic standards). These averages, however,
mask wide variations within the Commonwealth. Individual
perceptions of the state's economy differ depending on where
a person lives and in what industry he or she works.
Unemployment rates for the first three-quarters of 1983 range
from 3% on Nantucket to almost 12% for the Gardner, Athol,
and Ware areas (Exhibit 2). Wage levels vary from 6% above
the state average in Boston to 18% below in Fall River.
Much of this variation is due to the geographic
concentration of industries within the Commonwealth. Almost
20% of the manufacturing jobs in the Brockton area are in the
shoe industry; 40% in Fall River and 30% in New Bedford are
in apparel; 40% in Worcester are in the machining trades and
over 20% in the Fitchburg-Leominster region are in plastics.
Thus, while mature industries have lost their dominance from
a statewide perspective, they remain crucial to these and
other communities (Exhibit 3). High technology industries
have located primarily within the Route 495 belt around
Boston. Because high-growth industries have not yet expanded
on a significant scale into areas with declining industries,
the state's economic prosperity has not been evenly shared.
Not only are mature industries important from a regional
perspective, they are important as a source of jobs for
important segments of the state's workforce. They employ a
disproportionately high number of workers over the age of 45.
Immigrants often get their start in the apparel and shoe
industries. For workers with less than a high school
education, manufacturing jobs typically offer a higher wage
than the low-paying service sector jobs they would otherwise
have to take. In general, workers with little formal
education can more easily find career paths and opportunities
to move into higher paying jobs in mature manufacturing
industries than in other parts of the economy.
The current distribution of manufacturing employment in
the state shows the importance of several key industries.
The "high technology" components of non-electrical and
electrical machinery and instruments represent 40% of all
manufacturing employment. The remaining industries,
representing 60% of manufacturing employment, are what the
Commission has defined as "mature industries" (Exhibit 4)
•
Patterns of employment have varied dramatically over
time. Employment in high technology industries show dramatic
employment gains between 1950 and 1983 of from 50% to 200%.
Nature industries, even at this statewide aggregate level,
have very different employment profiles. The textile
industry had lost two-thirds of its 1950 employment by 1965.
Current employment is 17% of that in 1950. Paper products,
apparel, and chemicals have been declining since the 1970' s.
The shoe and food products industries have been seriously
declining through the entire period. Stone, clay and glass;
fabricated metals; and transportation equipment are highly
cyclical industries which have shown little. sustained growth
over the 33-year period. The rubber and plastics industry
has been fairly stable. Printing and publishing is the one
mature manufacturing industry that has shown slow but
relatively consistent growth (Exhibit 5)
.
For the most part, these trends are similar to those
occur ing nationwide. The United States has suffered a severe
decline in its share of. international trade in manufactured
goods, dropping from 22% in 1966 to 15% in 1980. At the same
time, import penetration in the U.S. market increased from 4%
to 14%. Relative to other developed countries, the U.S. has
sustained one of the most severe declines in manufacturing
employment. The decline of the manufacturing sector is a
national phenomenon.
Yet all of these industries contain highly successful,
growing, firms. Textile firms like the Kendall Corporation,
food processors like the West Lynn Creamery, and printing
machinery manufacturers like Compugraphic are promising
examples
.
Because mature industries are so important to particular
regions of the state and groups of workers, it is critical
that we identify and encourage opportunities for stability
and growth. To this end, the Commission addresses some of the
reasons for the decline of mature industries in the following
chapter of this report.
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WHY INDUSTRIES DECLINE: FACTORS AFFECTING MATURE INDUSTRIES
The decline in mature industries is a national and to
some extent international phenomenon. Many have written on
its causes. They range from macroeconomic factors driven by
government policies, down to relationships between managers
and workers on the shop floor. This chapter discusses
several of the forces which mature industries confront in
trying to remain competitive. Its purpose is to provide a
context in which to discuss how the public sector might
appropriately assist industry and is therefore only a brief
summary of issues which businesses must face. Those issues
fall into three catagories: macro-economic and international
factors, regional factors, and firm-specific factors.
MACRO-ECONOMIC AND INTERNATIONAL FACTORS
In a recent study by Data Resources, Inc., The DRI
Report qr U.S. Manufacturing Industries , several
macro-economic causes for the decline of U.S. manufacturing
industries were presented. They included the overvaluation
of the U.S. dollar through much of the postwar period;
extreme business cycles which affected business willingness
and ability to invest; tax and regulatory policies which
directed savings away from productive industrial investment;
trade policies which favored imports; and high capital costs
both in absolute terms and relative to other countries.
As a result of these forces, many companies have found
it difficult to remain competitive. As part of its work, the
Commission conducted studies of selected industries in the
state and saw evidence of the local effects of these factors.
Appendix B ("Industry Studies") details the results of this
work. Of particular importance were the effects of imports
from low-wage countries in industries such as shoes, apparel,
and some segments of the metalworking machinery industry. In
addition, swings in the business cycle are having a serious
impact on the machine tool industry. Made up of smaller
companies, this industry has found it difficult to adjust to .
variations in demand of as much as 100% in relatively short
time frames. The inability to meet explosions of domestic
demand contributed to providing an entree for Japanese
manufacturers who were able to produce to inventory so they*
could offer U.S. customers much prompter delivery dates than
local manufacturers.
REGIONAL FACTORS
In addition to these macroeconomic and international
forces, companies in Massachusetts must deal with factors
which differentially affect them vis-a-vis competitors
located elsewhere in the U.S. Regional factors are those
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related to the specific geography, relative location,
existing infrastructure, and governmental actions in a
particular locale. A business located in Massachusetts faces
some competitive advantages and some drawbacks; for different
industries, this mix may be more or less important.
In "The Massachusetts Agenda, 1983: A Competitive
Assessment of Our Economy", the Massachusetts Business
Roundtable listed nine concerns facing the state from
industry's perspective. They include taxation, government
expenditures, public pension funds, hazardous waste, energy
costs, transportation, education, health care costs, and
employee compensation.
Progress is being made in several of these areas:.
• While state and local taxes as a percent of
individual income were higher than the U.S.
average for many years, they have recently
fallen below the national average.
• Our roads, bridges, and other transportation
facilities are in serious need of repair and, in
many cases, replacement. Funding for infra-
structure development has not kept pace with the
need. The proposed creation of a state infra-
structure bank (MASSBANK) is in response to this
reality.
• A comprehensive overhaul of the state's pension
funding system was begun in 1983.
• Although Massachusetts health care costs remain
well above the national average, the state has
embarked on a major initiative to contain and,
in relative terms, reduce them.
In other areas, there are still problems. In 1982,
energy costs in Massachusetts were 21% higher than the
national average. While there are not many energy-intensive
industries in the Commonwealth, those which are here, like
the paper industry, are at some competitive disadvantage.
Moreover, virtually all nature industries suffer
disproportionately from high energy costs.
On the positive side, Massachusetts has one of the best
educated workforces in the country. In addition, several
companies interviewed in the course of the Commission's work
commented on the high productivity of Massachusetts workers.
Some aspects of the state's geographic location are a
plus for its businesses: it is within one day's drive to
over one-third of the U.S. market and two-thirds of the
Canadian market.
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FIRM SPECIFIC FACTORS
In many cases, a firm's inability to respond to
macro-economic or regional factors stems from firm-specific
issues involving how the company is owned or operated. In
general, they relate to ownership structure, size, management
capabilities, and labor relations.
Ownership Structure lassies.
The Commission found examples where corporate ownership
of Massachusetts businesses was of great importance in the
continued growth of the businesses by providing investment
capital, access to new channels of distribution, and
complementary product lines. It also found examples where
corporations did not invest in local businesses and "milked"
them for their profits. Members of the Massachusetts
financial community reported to the Commission that it is
sometimes the case—especially in mature industries—that
companies are purchased in order to gain access to customer
lists and respected brand names. As a result, local
manufacturing operations are then closed down.
Companies which are independently owned and run face the
problem of ownership and management transition when the owner
retires. In some cases, such companies are sold for their
non-tangible assets as described above. In other cases, new
owners cannot be found and an otherwise viable business
closes.
£iz& Is_sji£s_
Smaller companies in traditional industries often find
it difficult to remain competitive with their larger
competitors. This is due to several factors. New cost-
saving technologies are sometimes unsuitable to smaller
operations. CAD-CAM pattern graders in the shoe industry,
for example, are only cost-effective for companies producing
many different styles of shoes. Advances in stitching
technology will benefit large apparel manufacturers with long
run lengths of similar styles.
Overhead costs which typically represent a larger
percentage of total costs for smaller companies, can be a
problem. Particularly in urban areas like Boston, smaller
firms cannot sustain escalating rents. The costs of regu-
latory compliance also can be hard for these firms to absorb.
Smaller companies also often have limited management
resources. The apparel industry in Massachusetts, for
example, has a number of small firms where the owner is also
the manager who sometimes has to sit in for absent workers to
make a day's production. They have little time to upgrade
manufacturing operations or find new market opportunities.
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Finally, smaller firms may also have more difficulty in
accessing necessary capital.
Management Actions
The Data Resources study which detailed many of the
macroeconomic factors affecting industry also determined that
many companies responded to them by favoring acquisitions
over investment in their base businesses. They emphasized
short-run profitmaking over longer term investment
strategies, and mismanaged relationships with their workers.
The Commission found examples of the disasterous effects
of short-run profit maximization in the face of competition
from companies in developed countries in its industry
studies. The recent history of the Massachusetts textile
machinery industry provides a classic example of this
type of corporate behavior.
The textile machinery industry was once dominated by
innovative Massachusetts firms like Whitin Machine Works, the
Saco-Lowell shops, Draper Looms, Crompton and Knowles and
Davis and Ferber. With the 1983 closing of Davis and Ferber,
not one of these companies is now manufacturing in
Massachusetts. While the entire domestic industry has been
affected by the recent recession, it has also lost share of
the U.S. market to imports. Today, almost 50% of the
domestic market is held by imports from primarily high wage
countries such as West Germany, Switzerland, Italy and Japan.
The reason for the success of these imports is due
to foreign investments in new generations of machinery while
American manufacturers were making only marginal improvements
to their equipment. In part this was because designing new
equipment is expensive and somewhat risky. In part it was
because U.S. manufacturers could make more money in the
short-run by building up their spare parts, repair and
accessories businesses. As a result, the invention of water
and air jet, rapier and projectile looms and ringless
spinning machinery by foreign competitors revolutionized the
industry and left American manufacturers far behind.
While it is not the Commission's role to assess the
management capabilities of corporate decisionmakers, it is
important to note that it found examples of companies in
traditional industries where management was "mature" in the
sense that they had not adapted to changes occuring in their
businesses. Attitudes and procedures which worked for so
many years are difficult to put aside or recognize as no
longer appropriate for the competitive climate of the '80s.
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Locations! Issues.
While not always the case, many firms in traditional
industries are located in older facilities or in communities
that can present special problems. Older manufacturing
plants can be less efficient than newer ones for many
reasons. They may not be energy efficient; they may be
multi-level with a less than optimal plant layout; they may
require substantial investment in order to meet environmental
and worker safety regulations. In a more general sense, they
may not have room to expand; access to roads may be poor;
city services may not be sufficient to justify significant
expansion. Rectifying such problems may be too expensive for
some firms or communities. As a result, some firms may be
put at a competitive disadvantage or be forced to move.
CONCLUSIONS
Many of the factors affecting mature industries are the
result of national and international factors which cannot be
addressed by an individual state. Some locational factors
can be addressed by state government and others are the
result of the actual geographic location of the place. Firm-
specific factors are by their nature the responsibility of
companies and their workforces.
When companies close and there are no new businesses to
take their place, workers and communities suffer. The next
chapter of this report looks more closely at the recent
history of plant closings in Massachusetts and their effects
on workers and communities.
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THE COSTS OF TRANSITION: PLANT CLOSINGS AND MASS LAYOFFS IN
MASSACHUSETTS
When a business closes and new firms are not at the fore
to utilize local assets, workers and the community at large
must find ways to adjust to the loss of employment. The
worker who has lost his or her job bears the brunt of the
adjustment, but the community at large must also respond.
In order to understand the nature and magnitude of plant
closings in Massachusetts, the Commission conducted a survey
of plants with over 50 full-time employees which had closed
between January 1982 and December 1983. Appendix C, "Plant
Closings and Mass Layoffs in Massachusetts," presents a
detailed review of this analysis.
If anything, the Commission learned that every plant
closing is different. Yet two general situations
characterized many of the closings. The first represents
many apparel, textile, and shoe companies which had to
contend with aging owners, old and inefficient mill
buildings, concerns of their workforce, and import
competition. These companies were typically locally owned,
one-plant operations. They went out of business because of
management's inability to adjust to very difficult market
conditions. Some of these companies had been marginal
operations for some time, unable to afford upgrading their
equipment or marketing efforts. In many apparel firms, the
owner is the manager and sometimes has to fill in for absent
stitchers to meet daily quotas. This leaves little time to
look for new markets or cost-saving measures. The loss of a
major customer or an inability to cut costs can, and have,
precipitated closings.
The second type of closing occurred in corporate
subsidiaries closed by the parent, as part of a consolidation
or relocation of manufacturing operations. Many of these
companies were in the metalworking, machinery, and. electrical
equipment industries. In many cases, it was clear' that the
parent company had been disinvesting in the Massachusetts
subsidiary for some time and the closing was the final step
in the disinvestment process. In other cases, there had been
a real attempt to make the Massachusetts establishment a
viable business; but market forces and/or more favorable
manufacturing conditions in other corporate facilities led to
the decision to consolidate operations elsewhere.
THE MAGNITUDE OF THE PROBLEM
The findings of the Commission's own research on plant
closings which occurred in 1982 and 1983 in firms of over 50
full-time employees can be summarized as follows:
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• A total of 12,368 jobs were lost in the 67 plant
closings that occurred. This represented .5%
of the state's total employment base.
• Over 90% of the closings involved manufacturing
facilities.
• Regions of the state were differentially
affected by the closings. Ware lost 7% of
its employment base to closings during this
period; Gardner lost 4%; and Clinton and New
Bedford each lost 3%. In absolute numbers,
the Boston area lost the most jobs, but they
represented less than .3% of its employment
base.
• Apparel and leather products accounted for
25% of the job loss and 32% of the closings
(Exhibit 6)
.
• Of those workers for whom layoff notice could
be determined, 44% received less than one
month's notice, 27% received between one and
three months, and 29% received over three
months
.
• A study of permanent and indefinite layoffs
occur ing in the 8 month-period between January
and August of 1983 showed that 11,696 people
were laid off from 72 companies. Over half of
these workers were in the high technology
sector.
• In a survey of 25 of these firms, significant
notice of the layoff was much less prevalent
than in plant closing situations. However, the
firms tried to maintain ongoing relationships
with their workers because they expected to re-
hire them at a later date. In fact, many firms
had begun to recall their workers by December
1983.
Concern with plant closings grows out of the costs of
industrial decline on communities and the loss of jobs on
workers. If new employment opportunities existed to take the
place of departing firms, the problem would not exist.
However, the areas of the state hardest hit by closings are
these which have especially high unemployment rates. Growing
firms have not moved in to take their places.
Concern over the provision of notice of closings grows
out of two points. The first is that with time, it is
sometimes possible to find ways to turn the company around
and maintain the business or find a new company to take its
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place. The second point is that workers need time to adjust
to unemployment, both pyschologically and financially.
THE COSTS OF ECONOMIC DECLINE ON WORKERS
"What do I do now? What am I supposed to do? I been to
all the big corporations. They're not hiring. I don't have
the qualifications. Am I supposed to take a $5 cut in pay?
Do I stay on unemployment? Maybe I convinced you that I'm a
hard worker and a fast learner, but is that good enough to
get me a job? What does my family do? My whole family is
out of a job." "It's difficult to look for a new job when
you know that the only jobs available pay a lower hourly
wage, require travelling out-of-town and working a second
shift."
Such are the comments made by recently laidoff workers,
the first from a man hearing he had been laid off at his
Revere Sugar job, quoted in the Boston Phoenix : the second
from a woman who had worked at the same Clinton,
Massachusetts company for 30 years before it closed. A
fellow worker of hers, a machine tool operator for 17 years,
is now working as a janitor. Many others have remained
unemployed for several months since they lost their jobs.
The term "dislocated worker" has been used to describe
experienced and usually skilled workers who will have
difficulty finding employment opportunities utilizing their
existing abilities. According to national studies, these
people are often older members of the workforce with several
years seniority, have little formal education, had relatively
high earnings and a high occupational status.
These characteristics, while valuable to workers in
their former jobs, often work against them when they search
for new employment. Companies often do not want to hire
older workers, nor pay them as much as they were making. In
addition, benefits packages are often less, because the
worker has no seniority in the new job. As a result, some
studies indicate that dislocated workers are unemployed for
long stretches of time, and when they are reemployed, it is
in jobs paying substantially less than former positions.
Dislocated workers often have severe reactions to
unemployment. A number of studies show that these workers
suffer from increased psychological stress due to losing jobs
which they often held for decades. Many have not had to
search for a new job in several years and do not know how to
go about it. Family problems often develop due to the
economic and psychological affects of seeing their skills no
longer valued by society.
One of the most critical problems faced by unemployed
workers is the loss of health insurance benefits. According
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to a Congressional Budget Office Study, about 75% of full-
time wage and salary workers are covered through employment-
related group health plans , often in-part or fully paid for
by the employer as part of a benefits package. The cost of
continuing this coverage, once unemployed, can be
prohibitive: the same study found that in 1983, the average
monthly family premium for employment-based insurance is
$135, or about 28% of the average Unemployment Insurance
benefit.
Dislocated workers do not qualify for health care
services through Medicaid, because family assets often exceed
the limit allowed under Aid For Families With Dependent
Children (AFDC) or because income from other sources, such as
spouses' income is too high. Single people and childless
couples who are not aged, blind, or disabled, regardless of
income, cannot qualify for Medicaid.
While it is difficult to present a systematic picture of
the effect of dislocation on Massachusetts workers and their
families, two studies which considered workers in
Massachusetts and Connecticut confirm the findings of
national studies. The United Electrical Workers Union Local
276 formed an Unemployed Council in the Athol-Orange area and
surveyed 200 unemployed workers in the spring of 1983. They
found that 65% of the workers had no health care coverage.
In addition, 35% were delinquent in their utility payments
and 39% were delinquent in their rent or mortgage payments.
Social service agencies in the region reported a 63% increase
in new cases.
UAW Region 9A, in conjunction with the Boston College
Social Welfare Institute, conducted an intensive study of 105
people from Massachusetts and Connecticut who had experienced
long-term or indefinite layoffs. While 22 of the workers
were employed in the auto industry (the Framingham GM
facility) , the remaining 83 were employed in non-auto related
manufacturing firms. These workers fit the profile generally
associated with dislocated workers: 72% were male and 28%
female, the average age was 47, with 58% of the workers 46
years or older. - Sixty-three percent of the workers lost
their employer-paid health insurance. Twenty-two percent
were not covered at all by health insurance while they were
unemployed. Twenty-four percent exhausted their life savings
during their unemployment and 50% used up half or more of
their savings to tide them over. Of the workers who found
new employment, the new jobs paid on average 20% less than
their prior positions and had reduced benefits, especially
with regard to health insurance coverage. The term
"skidding" is applied to this phenomenon of workers taking
lower paying positions because no others are available to
them.
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While there are no rigorous estimates of the number of
dislocated workers in the state, the Commission staff's
extrapolation of the data that is available suggests that
the
ran"ge
P
?s between 2S?000 and 40,000, and even higher if those
reemployed at lower paying jobs are included.
THE COST TO THE COMMUNITY AND THE COMMONWEALTH
When a major employer in a community closes, the effects
qo beyond those on the former workforce. Spendable income in
the community drops, affecting merchants; and local suppliers
may have lost a major customer. As a result, the employment
impact can be greater than just the direct loss of Dobs. In
one recent plant closing situation in the state, the loss of
a maior electricity user resulted in increased utility rates
for the community. As indicated in the Athol-Orange study,
local social service agencies must respond to a growing
client base. In areas experiencing one major or a series of
closings, the tax base will be affected. Chicopee,
Massachusetts lost $500,000 in tax revenues when the Oniroyal
plant closed.
A study was conducted by the University of Massachusetts
on the potential impact of the closing of Adams Printworks, a
firm which was subsequently turned around through state
intervention. The study found that in addition to the direct
loss of 577 jobs, 340 additional jobs would be lost in
Berkshire County and 160 more statewide in the services,
trade, transportation, finance, and public utilities sectors.
Using an economic model, the study estimated that this total
job loss would result in a $3 million cost to the state in
lost federal, state and local tax revenue; and a $3 million
increase in government transfer payments in 1983 alone.
Costs were projected to be lower in future years, but were
expected to extend out for some time.
Quickly bringing new employment opportunities to the
community would minimize the costs of a plant closing.
However this is not a realistic short-term option for many of
the Commonwealth's cities and towns. Many communities do not
have economic development officials to work on attracting new
firms to the area. A recent survey of the reuse of 44
facilities vacated due to plant closings showed that these
facilities were generally newly occupied by firms already
located in the community who needed space for expansion. In
a community with few expanding firms, finding new sources of
employment becomes more difficult.
Even in communities with active development programs,
revitalizing the local economic base can be extremely
difficult. A study of Clinton, Massachusetts, by a Tufts
University graduate student group provides an example. This
central Massachusetts community has seen the coming and going
of its textile and wire industries over past decades. In
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more recent years, Clinton has suffered from two major and
other smaller plant closings. Since 1977 the Colonial Press
(later the Clinton Cooperative Press), then the town's
largest employer, and Ray-O-Vac have closed.
In 1978 the town formed a task force for economic
development and shortly after, funded an Office of Community
and Economic Development. Despite raising over $5 million in
state and federal funds and issuing $16.9 million in
industrial revenue bonds over the intervening years,
Clinton's manufacturing employment and average earnings in
1982 were below 1977 levels. Public funding generally led to
increased employment in the relatively low wage plastics and
non-manufacturing sectors. In some cases, employment levels
committed to by firms receiving public funds have yet to be
met.
Clinton's experience exemplifies the problems many
Massachusetts communities face in economic development. Like
many of the small towns in the Commonwealth, its location,
highway access, and labor force are not attractive to many
growing high technology firms. Over the long run, adjustment
may take the form of a declining population. In the short
term, there are few opportunities for reemploying dislocated
workers.
CONCLUSIONS
In summary, from a state perspective, plant closings are
not currently a major problem in Massachusetts. However some
regions of the Commonwealth have been drastically affected,
as have workers who have been unable to find new jobs
comparable in pay and benefits to the ones they have lost.
The strength of the state's overall economy attests to
the ability of most companies in mature industries to develop
successful businesses. The next chapter of this report
summarizes some of the ways in which they have been able to
achieve this.
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GROWING FIRMS IN MATURE INDUSTRIES:
WHAT BUSINESSES DO TO SUCCEED
As mentioned earlier, there are many firms in mature
industries doing quite well in the Commonwealth. They have
become successful for many reasons. In this chapter, the
Commission highlights three aspects of successful business
strategies used by firms in the state. They are:
• integrating high tech within a mature business
• developing "niche" strategies; and
• investing in new technology and products.
INTEGRATING HIGH TECHNOLOGY WITHIN A MATURE BUSINESS
Conventional wisdom differentiates high technology firms
from "mature" or traditional industries. However, the
distinction between "mature" and "high tech" begins to blur
at the company level. The Commission found many cases in
which companies in mature industries had characteristics
generally attributed to high technology companies: aggressive
management, high levels of research and development, and a
changing technological base.
Progressive managers of companies in traditional
industries have found ways to integrate various aspects of
the high technology sector within their businesses. In more
specific terms, there are at least three ways in which what
is usually considered to be "high tech" affects mature
industries: through providing new market opportunities, new
manufacturing technologies and through providing new .
materials.
The computer industry has opened up new market
opportunities for the plastics industry through its demand
for computer casings and other components, for the metal
trades through its demand for wire and cables, as well as for
other industries. The Kendall Corporation, a nonwoven
textiles company is now manufacturing the covers for software
diskettes in Massachusetts.
New manufacturing processes have developed in mature
industries utilizing computers for inventory control, work
scheduling and other tasks. Computer aided design (CAD) has
been introduced in the shoe industry in the form of pattern
grading equipment that allows shoe manufacturers to more
efficiently produce patterns for the range of sizes needed
for a new shoe style. Process control equipment for textile
manufacturing has improved the quality of fabric production.
New plastics compounds with improved characteristics
allow the plastics industry to offer new products which are
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cost competitive with other materials such as wood, metal or
glass.
DEVELOPING "NICHE" STRATEGIES
In many industries, Massachusetts once was the home of
major industry leaders. Many of the remaining companies in
mature industries are still here and thriving because they
have identified small markets in which they could effectively
compete
•
The Massachusetts textile industry provides many
examples of successful "niche" strategies, where a company
can dominate a small market. Lower labor and energy costs in
the South attracted New England's major textile mills decades
ago. The textile companies which remain are those in which
quality and service to the customer are more important than
the lowest price, or in which local companies have a
technology or scale advantage in a market too small to
attract major competitors. One Massachusetts firm has 40% of
the world market in fabric for ladies 1 "foundation garments".
A handful of Massachusetts firms together represent 60% of
U.S. production in wool felt.
Shoe companies sometimes follow similar strategies.
Imported shoes now represent over 60% of the non-rubber
footwear purchased in the United States. While it is
becoming increasingly difficult to manufacture a cost-
competitive low or mid-priced shoe in the U.S., some
Massachusetts manufacturers have been able to focus on high-
priced men's shoes or baby shoes. These represent relatively
small markets which have, so far, been somewhat shielded from
imports.
Apparel companies in Massachusetts also follow niche
strategies. Apparel contractors (who stitch garments for
other manufacturers' brands) have been able to find business
opportunities in higher-priced ladies sportswear, where quick
delivery time on reorders is critical, making importing a
risky affair. Higher labor costs are offset by the ability
of firms to produce quality garments and deliver them on time
to the market. Clothes with the labels of Anne Klein, Jones
of New York, Ellen Tracy and College Town have been
manufactured in Massachusetts.
INVESTING IN NEW PRODUCTS AND TECHNOLOGY
Given the changes occuring in markets and technology,
successful companies are often the ones most willing and able
to risk investing in new ideas. Innovation and risk taking
are often the keys to success in mature industries as well as
in high technology business. Many Massachusetts firms take
this path. For example, Tweave is a textile company with
expertise in weaving stretch fabrics. After years of
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investment in research and development,
they have developed a
way to weave ^tetchy upholstery fabric.
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The Drintino machinery industry, discussed in more
detail in
P
the industry Studies' Appendix, is a Massachusetts
success story due to the willingness of the
newspaper
industry to finance the development of new
Panting
technologies by what was once a small Massachusetts
firm-
Compugraphics—and is now an industry leader.
There are other contributing factors to the
success of
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STATE EFFORTS TO ASSIST WORKERS AND INDUSTRY
Many of the problems faced by mature industries cannot
be addressed by policies of state government. The state
cannot affect the value of the dollar, remove trade barriers,
equalize labor costs between Massachusetts and foreign
competitors, prohibit businesses from closing, or require
private companies to invest.
There is, however, much the state can do and is in fact
doing, to promote the growth of mature industries and to
minimize the effects of economic transition on individuals
and communities. Existing state programs range from the
Bay State Skills Corporation for training to quasi-public
financial institutions and tax incentives which provide funds
to many Massachusetts companies in traditional industries.
Although the Commission did not survey or evaluate all
state programs, it did look in some detail at specific
programs of special concern to mature industries, including
employment and training programs, state financing programs
and other programs to assist business. (See Appendix D,
"Public Sector Resources for Businesses 1 Financial Needs,"
for a review of financing resources for businesses and
Appendix E, "The State's Employment and Training System" for
more detail on employment and training programs.) The
Commission found that many of the pieces of a "mature
industries strategy" are already in place. What is needed is
a combination of a few relatively modest additions to the
existing array of programs, and a much stronger effort to
coordinate, focus, and market those programs we already have.
FINANCING PROGRAMS
The overwhelming proportion of capital and credit for
business expansion and development is supplied by the
retained earnings of corporations and by private sector
financial institutions such as commercial banks, insurance
companies, pension funds, leasing companies and venture
capitalists. Private capital markets are extraordinarily
diverse and respond quickly and efficiently to opportunities
perceived to be profitable. This is especially true in
Massachusetts where private sector financial institutions are
particularly sophisticated and active.
Yet, even in such a financially sophisticated state,
experience has shown that "capital gaps" can develop and
persist. Sometimes, for a variety of reasons, the private
sector fails to supply sufficient amounts of capital at
acceptable market rates. The Massachusetts Business
Development Corporation, for instance, was established in
1953 by the State Legislature to increase financing
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opportunities for small and medium-sized businesses having
trouble getting financing from conventional sources.
In 1977, during the first Dukakis Administration, a
Task Force on Capital Formation identified several areas
where private capital markets were not filling financing
needs. This Task Force recommended the creation of a number
of quasi-public financial institutions to supplement the one
existing institution, the Massachusets Business Development
Corporation (MBDC) . The new institutions included:
• Massachusetts Industrial Finance Corporation
(MIFA) to promote long-term, tax exempt plant
and equipment financing available on a state-
wide basis;
• Massachusetts Technology Development Corpora-
tion (MTDC) to increase the supply of venture
capital to technology-based enterprises;
• Massachusetts Community Development Finance
Corporation (MCDFC) to assist in the revi-
talization of depressed communities by
investing with local community development
corporations; and
• Massachusetts Capital Resource Company (MCRC)
to provide intermediate and long-term, sub-
ordinated debt and equity to smaller firms.
Massachusetts has also made effective use of a number of
federal programs that are available for industrial finance,
including the Community Development Block Grant (through the
capitalization of revolving loan funds and the creation of an
Economic Development Set-Aside Small Cities program) ; the
Federal Trade Adjustment Assistance Program; Urban
Development Action Grants; and the Small Business
Administration's 503 Program (Exhibit 7)
.
These programs increase access to capital without
significant expense to Massachusetts taxpayers. MIFA's
Industrial Revenue Bond Program qualifies firms for federal
tax-exempt bonds, with no cost to the state. The UDAG, Trade
Adjustment Assistance, Small Cities Set-Aside and SBA 503
Programs are all federally-funded. Massachusetts Capital
Resource Company, capitalized by the Massachusetts insurance
industry, is indirectly financed by the State through a tax
reduction for the insurance industry. The only other
significant state resources used have been one-time funding
to CDFC ($10 million), MIFA ($10 million for loan guarantees)
and MTDC ($2 million).
The state makes its most significant investment in
business expansions through various tax credit programs.
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Roughly $50 million a year in "tax expenditures" go to firms,
mainly through the stated Investment Tax Credit. Such
credits, like most of the quasi-public institutions, benefit
profitable firms which are expanding or upgrading their plant
and equipment. Unlike the programs mentioned above which
select their own portfolios, tax expenditures are an
entitlement program which can be used by every company making
a qualified investment.
In general, the agencies are doing the jobs for which
they were established. Each has adapted and modified its
focus since 1977 in response to changes in the state and
national economies and in the behavior of private capital
markets. Host have identified and tried to fill particular
roles and niches in the market place. Most have established
strong internal systems and controls, are staffed by
experienced professionals and work well with other public and
private financial institutions. These programs have
complemented, not competed with, private market financing and
they address clear public needs.
Much has changed since 1977. Today, the specific and
often unique problems of firms in traditional industries are
much clearer and more pressing than they appeared in 1977.
To some extent, the existing private, public and quasi-public
institutions have adapted to the diverse financing needs of
these firms—for expansion, modernization, stabilization,
innovation, and ownership changes.
Massachusetts firms have access to a wider array of
public institutions than companies in most states. An
estimated $3 billion has passed through these institutions
since 1978. These institutions open up longer-term and more
subordinated financing to smaller firms than is generally
available through commercial lending institutions. Given the
importance of small and mid-sized companies expanding in the
state, the breadth of innovative financing for such firms is
welcome
.
Special Needs o_f Mature, industries
Against this background of existing programs, the
Commission identified three areas of special capital needs
among firms in traditional industries in Massachusetts:
• affordable expansion capital for plant and
equipment
• capital for financing ownership changes or
high risk corporate turnarounds; and
• financing for the development of new
product and process technologies.
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It appears that between the private and public sectors,
expansion financing is available for most credit worthy
firms. The breadth and variety of existing financing
mechanisms is encouraging. MIFA's proposed new Guaranteed
Loan Program has the potential to open up an additional $300
million to smaller firms having trouble accessing long-term,
fixed-rate debt. More aggressive marketing of the MIFA
Mortgage Insurance Program would greatly enhance the ability
of less credit worthy traditional companies to locate
affordable fixed asset funding.
In the other two areas, there is still progress to be
made. Leveraged buyouts have become a popular way for people
with a direct stake in a conglomerate or family-owned firm to
keep the company alive and make it grow when a change of
ownership threatens its continuance. In the past few years,
the Massachusetts Capital Resource Company and the
Massachusetts Business Development Corporation have
participated in a number of leveraged buyouts, helping
management in older firms finance the purchase of their firms
from owners, usually either a large conglomerate or a small
family-run concern. But the number of such loans has been
quite small.
An additional area of need is assistance for companies
which could remain viable if restructured. In cases like
Adams Printworks, when a plant is threatened with closing,
the social costs to the state (measured in terms of lost tax
revenues and increased social welfare costs) is often greater
than the cost of helping the firm restructure. The existing
resources—the quasi-publics and the CDBG-funded mechanisms
for low-interest loans—are not in themselves equipped to
take on the level of risk associated with such turnaround
situations.
A final area of financing need identified by the
Commission is that of financing for the development of
new products. Investigations of plant closings in the state
have uncovered examples of shutdowns where a lack of
investment was cited as a cause. This underinvestment is
sometimes due to the preceived risk of new product
development in industries which do not have a history of such
innovation.
None of the programs described in this report can meet
this special need. The Massachusetts Technology Development
Corporation could potentially make investments in product
development. However, it is limited to investments in
"technology-related" companies and its Board of Directors
reflects this orientation. Specific programs designed to
promote new product investment and reduce its risk is an area
where increased public sector assistance could help
revitalize some traditional companies.
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This review of public sector financing programs points
to additional issues of concern to public policymakers.
First, although there is a good deal of cooperation among the
state quasi-public agencies, there is no formal coordination
or clearinghouse of information on projects.
Second, many businesses in the state still do not
know about the availability of many of these financing
programs. Although there have been some attempts to market
these programs, more effort is needed. It is important that
the state educate the financial, legal and accounting
communities, as well as the companies themselves, to the
existence of these programs.
Third, so called micro-businesses with financing needs
of under $250,000 may have more difficulty in locating
affordable fixed rate long-term capital. The high
information and transaction costs associated with making very
small loans limit the availability of funds to smaller
businesses. A review of the quasi-public institutions
revealed very few loans in the under $250,000 range.
Finally, the programs described in this report have all
been chartered with specific public purposes, many related to
state goals for job creation, economic development and
revitalization of distressed communities. There has been no
systematic assessment of the public returns from these uses
of public resources. Although beyond the mandate of this
Commission, evaluating these public returns is a critical
step to any further program design for publicly chartered or
funded programs.
EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING RESOURCES
The Commonwealth's major employment and training (E&T)
programs consist of a broad array of programs, 800 in 1984,
some with overlapping goals and client groups and
administered through nine state agencies or institutions.
Excluded from this count are numerous programs conducted
through local organizations and ones which are not part of an
ongoing agency effort. Few of them are geared to the needs
of dislocated workers (Exhibit 8)
.
Many of these programs were developed in response to
separate federal mandates. The extent to which they have
been successfully adapted to the special needs of the
Commonwealth is unclear. They represent millions of dollars
of resources, yet until the creation of the state's Office of
Training and Employment Policy in 1983, there was no single
effective coordinating body to assure that as a whole, they
are focused, targeted, and interpreted. That effort is now
underway.
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The entire E & T system has recently undergone many
changes. In the late 1970* s, two new concepts regarding
employment and training were developed. First, there was
recognition of the importance of business involvement in
program planning and implementation. Second, a distinct and
growing group of workers needing special assistance,
dislocated workers, was identified.
The recently enacted Federal Job Training Partnership
Act (JTPA) reflected these two concerns. Under JTPA, local
Private Industry Councils (PICs) including business and
labor, as well as service provider representation, were
established to advise Service Delivery Areas (SDAs) on labor
market needs and ways to meet them. In addition, special
funds (Title III) were allocated for assisting dislocated
workers. At the state level, the Secretary of Economic
Affairs established the Dislocated Workers Task Force in 1983
to develop an effective strategy for using the JTPA
Dislocated Workers funds. The Commission has tried to
complement the recommendations of this task force.
In addition to the JTPA program, the state has many
of its own training programs, run by regional vocational-
technical schools, community colleges, the Bay State Skills
Corporation and apprenticeship training organizations. Given
the potential of this system, the Commission has tried to
identify ways to further strengthen the programs and to
better address the problems of mature industries and their
workers. As part of this effort, several factors emerged
which constrain the effectiveness of these programs. They
fall into the following categories:
• labor market information
• state-level E & T strategy
• coordination among service providers
• sufficient funding levels.
Lflfror Market Information
Any effective planning of E & T programs requires
accurate statistics on current and future labor demand and
the numbers of workers in various target groups. This
information must be aggregated at the regional level to be
useful. Currently the number of displaced workers in
Massachusetts is not known. Efforts are being made by some
of the PICs to gather this information. The Division of
Employment Security (DES) can help lagging PICs develop the
data base they need to design programs.
In general, the labor market information collected by
DES needs to be made more useable for program planners,
employers and workers who rely on it. Some of the
improvements are minor: publicizing existing data, including
contact people on documents and reformatting existing data.
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Others are more fundamental: creating regional data packages
and instituting computer programs to track specific labor
market trends and groups of workers for special studies or
demonstration programs, particularly for economic development
purposes.
state £evei Employment And Training Strategy
Although it was not the purpose of this Commission to
assess the purpose, goals and policies of the E & T system,
it became clear during the Commission's work that the
development of a state E & T strategy is essential. Resource
allocation, of particular concern during this period of
funding cutbacks, becomes critical as the system is now being
asked to develop services for dislocated as well as
disadvantaged workers. Service providers believe that
improvements are possible in responding to the needs of both
groups.
An overall strategy for the state is needed that
responds to the needs of all groups of workers and assists
planners who must make funding decisions in response to
existing and potential labor demand. It must include
consideration of the long-term unemployed, who are currently
no longer covered by unemployment insurance and are therefore
outside the system. This is a matter that should be
addressed at the highest state level, requiring the
participation of all major E & T providers. The State Job
Training Coordinating Council is an appropriate group for
such strategy development; it is the policy making body for
JTPA and advises the new Office of Training and Employment
Policy.
Coordination Among Service Providers
The need for effective coordination of programs is
evident from the agency descriptions. Even though there are
funding relationships and some cooperation among agencies,
improving this could mean more effective use of resources and
better service from the clients' point of view. At the local
level, the PICs are in the position to provide this, by
maintaining relationships with agencies within their regions.
At the state level, coordination should be a result of a
coherent E & T strategy.
Sufficient Funding Lej&ls.
The state has developed a three-pronged approach to
assistance for dislocated workers: intervention at the time
of a plant closing or major layoff; establishment of ongoing
worker assistance programs for the long-term unemployed; and
experimentation with job creation through its Cooperative
Regional Industrial Laboratories (CRIL) Program which seeks
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to harness the knowledge of laidoff workers in selected
industr: s s for new business ideas.
Current funding is a combination of 1983 and 1984 JTPA
monies. With two years 1 worth of federal funds, only five of
the eight regions of the state with unemployment rates 120%
of the state average have worker assistance centers. One
CRIL project has been established, with two on the drawing
boards, but with no source of funding. In addition, there is
currently no source of funds to implement any of the ideas
the CRIL projects are expected to develop.
While there are no good estimates of how many of the
state's unemployed are dislocated workers, the number is
probably in the 20,000 to 40,000 range. Costs for assisting
them range from a few hundred dollars for helping with job
search skills to a few thousand dollars for retraining. As
yet it is too early to tell how many need intensive
retraining assistance.
Existing funding levels are too low, especially since
federal funds for 1985 will not equal the combination of 1983
and 1984 funds currently in use. If the state is to make a
serious commitment to dislocated workers, federal funds must
be supplemented with state monies.
OTHER STATE ASSISTANCE TO BUSINESSES
The state also has an extensive network of business
assistance programs within the Department of Commerce and
Development, the Executive Office of Communities and
Development, and the Governor's Office of Economic
Development that provides a broad array of services to the
business community.
For the most part, state assistance programs have
focused on promoting the expansion of existing in-state
businesses, supporting the development of new enterprises,
and attracting new industries to the state. Given likely
sources of job growth, this is the most effective strategy.
The state has, however, been brought into situations
where a firm is on the verge of closing. In few of the cases
could the closing be prevented. However, the Commission
found that there are situations where concerted efforts by
the community and the state can revitalize an ailing firm.
The Commission heard testimony on the case of Adams
Printworks, in North Adams, Massachusetts. This company was
closing because of a history of poor management and a severe
recession in the textile industry. A study by private
consultants found that the business itself was viable and
that new management could lead to a successful turnaround.
With community and state assistance (and CDFC taking a
leadership role) new management was found and the company was
34
outcome remains unclear.
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The state's efforts! however, have until
recently consisted
of uncoordinated attempts at crisis
intervention.
in response to the need for a more
coordinated approach,
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limited success in preventing plant closings.
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anv effective assistance. The Commission
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problems through its recommendations for a
Massachusetts
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CONCLUSIONS
Massachusetts offers a wide array of employment
and
training and financing programs to assist
industries and
workers! The state's growing businesses receive
the lions
snare of attention. While existing financing
programs offer
a wealth of resources to firms needing capital
for plant and
equipment expansion, there are no programs to assist
firms m
develoDina new products or processes. Nor is there a
means
n? avstemltic assessment and assistance for firms that are
in
trouble Mo?eovlr!?he Commonwealth has only recently
begun
to develop coordinated approaches to employment
and training
issues. There is also a need for increased resources
directed at dislocated workers.
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RECOMMENDATIONS
The Commission on the Future of Mature Industries
directed its recommendations at promoting industrial
development and easing the burdens on workers, communities
and businesses caused by industrial decline. All of the
recommendations are offered in the spirit of promoting
industrial well-being throughout the State. The Commonwealth
recognizes fully the limited role available to state
government in the arena of industrial change. But we believe
that thoughtful, collaborative efforts by business, labor and
government can make a difference.
When businesses find capital costs too high or new
projects too risky to undertake alone, there is a role for
the public sector to play when employment opportunities are
at stake. When workers are laid off and find they cannot get
comparable jobs because of their age or lack of training,
public sector training efforts are called for. When
companies find they must introduce new manufacturing
processes, their workforces are a key factor in their
successful implementation. When communities are losing a
disproportionately large part of their economic base with no
offsetting influx of new businesses, concerted efforts on the
part of government to market new business locations to the
private sector as well as companies* willingness to
consider those new locations are essential.
At the heart of these collaborative efforts is the
recommendation of a social compact among business, labor and
government. The compact, discussed in more detail below,
calls for cooperative efforts to foster industrial growth
within the State and, where job losses occur, to deal with
them in a productive and responsible fashion.
In designing these recommendations the Commission built
upon the solid foundation of programs already in place in the
Commonwealth. These include our existing employment and
training network, quasi-public financing agencies, and a
broad array of business assistance programs. Rather than
create any new bureaucracy, the recommendations call for
stronger efforts to coordinate, focus, and market existing
capabilities and for modest additions to existing programs.
The Commission's recommendations include the following:
• TfiL help viable businesses mc-flernize and grow;
- Three important new quasi-public financing
mechanisms: MIFA's proposed Guaranteed Loan
Program for industrial modernization and
expanded use of the MIFA Insurance Fund for
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higher risk industrial loans, and a Product
Development Fund for existing firms seeking
to bring new products to market.
- A state-level industry assistance capabil-
ity within the Department of Commerce to
target our available business development
resources to industries with special problems
and opportunities common to many firms.
• Xo_ address £h£ problems o_£ troubled flCIPS;
- A Massachusetts Industrial Service to coor-
dinate on a case-by-case basis state efforts
to evaluate and, when appropriate, assist
troubled businesses which are potentially
viable. In cases when businesses cannot
survive, the Service will coordinate state
efforts to reemploy the workforce and to
find ways to reuse plant facilities. This
will be housed in the Executive Office of
Economic Affairs and jointly administered by
the Secretaries of Economic Affairs and
Labor.
• xo_ cushion £te impacts o£ p_ian£ closings oji
workers aM communities;
- A social compact among business, labor and
government establishing the appropriate
- responses of the public and private sectors.
The compact encourages advance notification
and income maintenance on the part of
employers and anticipates legislation
extending employer-based group health cover-
age for ninety (90) days after a plant
closing.
- A Reemployment Assistance Program for
workers who lose their jobs. This program
includes on-site placement and counseling
services as well as expanded and targeted
retraining opportunities for displaced
workers. Workers who lose their jobs in
plant closings, receive less than ninety
(90) days 1 notification or severance bene-
fits from their former employers and parti-
cipate in available reemployment programs
will be eligible for a supplemental unem-
ployment insurance benefit following the
closing.
- A thorough exploration of "short-time work"
or worksharing for< firms anticipating layoffs
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or plant closings, in order to spread the
burden of declining job demand.
• x& h£l£ guide a mature industrial economy in.
transition;
- A state level economic monitoring capabil-
ity within the Executive Office of Economic
Affairs to enable policy makers to follow
changing trends in the economies of the
state and its various regions.
- An improved employment and training system
which explicitly links the new Job Train-
ing Partnership Act (JTPA) mechanism to the
problems of this state's on-going industrial
transition. The reemployment needs of dis-
located workers, and the workforce needs of
viable businesses are priority concerns.
- An Industrial Advisory Board consisting of
the Secretaries of Economic Affairs and
Labor, other appropriate public officials
and representatives of business, the
Massachusetts A.F.L.-C.I.O. , the academic
community and community leaders. The Board
will help shape and monitor the implementa-
tion of the Commission's recommendations and
will provide the Governor and the Legislature
with a useful sounding board.
The following pages expand upon these recommendations
and their component proposals.
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EXPAND PUBLIC SECTOR CREDIT OPPORTUNITIES: THE MIFA
GUARANTEED LOAN PROGRAM, THE MIFA INSURANCE FUND AND A NEW
PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT FUND
The Commission's industry studies and in-depth
discussions with business groups and members of the financial
community revealed the importance of affordable and available
credit in the effort of mature companies to remain
competitive. Innovations which result in the development of
new products can revitalize a company, as illustrated by the
printing machinery industry here in Massachusetts. Such
innovations are often quite risky and may require
unconventional sources of financing. This is particularly
true in mature industries where the venture capital market
and Research and Development Limited Partnerships are not
widely available sources of finance.
In addition, the Commission found examples of companies
in mature industries who had the opportunity to expand but
could not access traditional capital markets either because
interest rates were too high to be supported by expected
returns or because the company could not collateralize the
loans to the degree required by conventional lenders.
__s. a i£sjil£ o_f these findings, the. Commission endorses
pending legislation £& create MIFA's Guaranteed I&an Program
and. considers this, nej_ method slL ULLLh lending i0.t2e.0_f
fundamental importance j_o_
____fc__j__t industries. ______ Commission
__1____ supports the. expansion __f MIFA's Mortgage Insurance
PrograiRi Finally 1 the Commission proposes ____§. establishment
o_f
__ Product Development __u______
The new MIFA Guaranteed Loan Program has the potential
to make up to $300 million in long-term, fixed-rate, debt
financing available to smaller firms needing to expand or
modernize their plant or equipment. While not reserved for
mature industries, this new form of MIFA lending is expected
to be of particular benefit to the states' mature
manufaturing base, which has also dominated the traditional
MIFA portfolio. The Commission strongly endorses Senate Bill
2021, which will establish the Guaranteed Loan Program and
authorize creation of a separate Insurance Fund as described
below.
The Commission recommends that MIFA expand its
Industrial Mortgage Insurance Program to assist companies
unable to obtain sufficient modernization or expansion
capital from conventional lending sources. The provision of
MIFA insurance for particular projects enables a bank to lend
a higher percentage against the collateral value of fixed
assets by reducing the lender's exposure by 20% to 40%,
depending on the structuring of the arrangement. Thus,
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mortgage insurance for either tax-exempt industrial revenue
bonds or conventional loans can convince private lenders to
"stretch" their loan commitments in support of important
projects that will retain or expand jobs.
Pending legislation will reserve $2 million to support
the insurance of up to $18 million in industrial mortgages.
This amount in turn can leverage between $45 and $90 million
in loans as private lenders will obtain a guarantee on only
the riskiest portion of the financing.
MIFA should also review the performance of its existing
Mortgage Insurance Program to determine if procedures need to
be streamlined. In addition, it should launch an aggressive
promotional campaign oriented primarily to bankers. MIFA
should seek additional capitalization for this Mortgage
Insurance Fund if early efforts generate sufficient expanded
demand from traditional sectors of the economy for plant,
land, and equipment financing.
Promoting new product development by companies is a way
of supporting growth opportunities that can provide new
sources of employment and continued profitability. In many
cases companies themselves are able to bear the risk and cost
involved in new product development and market introduction.
For many high technology projects, research and development
partnerships are available. But for other companies, funds
for new product development are not forthcoming, either
because the project involves a lower rate of return than
competing projects or because the amount of money needed is
less than what is feasible for structuring research and
development limited partnerships. The proposed Product
Development Fund would help fill this gap.
The funds could be used to provide assistance in the
following situations:
• the introduction of new products by firms in
industries with aging product lines
• the commercialization by Massachusetts firms of
research efforts in the state's universities
• the development of new products by smaller
companies who cannot access needed funds
It is not anticipated that companies requesting such
assistance will be in direct competition with other
Massachusetts firms.
The investments of such a program would more closely
resemble venture capital than conventional equity or debt.
Their purpose would be to share the risk with a company on a
specific project. The investment, however, would not be in
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the company but in the product. The state's participation in
any one product should not exceed 25% of its total costs.
Financing would be structured as a loan that gets paid back
only when the project is successful, in the form of royalty
payments based on the sales of the product. Return is
therefore a function of how successful the product is.
Similar programs in Connecticut and other countries have
proven to be financially viable, generating significant
returns. The Commission recommends an initial capitalization
of $2 million, with a potential capitalization of as much as
$15 million to be authorized as the Fund develops a track
record and as a pool of eligible applications builds.
Such a fund would not break wholly new ground. The
Massachusetts Technology Development Corporation, the state's
public venture capital instrument for high technology start-
ups, reaches companies not fully serviceable in the private
market, but its portfolio, capitalized by modest state
appropriations, has made money. MTDC also proivides
financial and technical assistance to firms, enabling them to
secure some or all of their needed capital from private
sources, a role which the Product Development Fund should
also play.
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DEVELOP A STATE-LEVEL INDUSTRY ASSISTANCE CAPABILITY
The Commission's industry studies revealed that
important issues often affect many firms in a single
industry. While some programs take an industry perspective,
this is a fairly new approach for state government. In some
cases the appropriate role for government is that of a
catalyst, identifying common problems among companies and
helping them find joint solutions. In other cases someone
sensitive to industry-wide needs can help focus existing
public programs on those needs.
The development of such industry strategies should
become an important focus for the state Department of
Commerce. Possible industry-wide programs include the
following:
• Supporting special industry-specific export
programs. For example the state could bring
together companies producing complementary goods
to market the products overseas as a package.
The Office of International Trade and Investment
within the Executive Office of Economic Affairs
has begun such efforts, investigating growing
market opportunities in both developed and
developing countries.
• Promoting economies of scale through joint pur-
chase of specialized equipment, joint lease/
purchase of a plant, or jointly sponsored re-
search and development. Examples of such an
effort could be promoting the joint purchase of
computer-aided design (CAD) pattern grader by
shoe companies or supporting efforts by small
apparel or shoe companies to locate in a
commonly-serviced incubator building.
• Promoting technology transfer by providing
engineers with special expertise in production
to consult with companies on technological
changes, or through facilitating the transfer
of relevant university research to an industry.
Examples of this type of activity might include
a continuation of the plant engineering assis-
tance that the United States Trade Adjustment
Act provided to the apparel industry.
• Seizing opportunities to change federal
policies that impact particular Massachusetts
industries, as the Commonwealth did in support-
ing the 200-mile fishing limit in the mid-
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1970' s; thus resulting in major expansion of the
fishing and fish processing industries.
Helping existing programs like those being
developed through the Massachusetts Executive
Office of Energy Resources to identify
industries most likely to benefit from energy
audits and conservation measures.
Assessing the adequacy of equipment used in
industry-specific training programs such as
those for the textile sciences and machining
trades.
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ESTABLISH AN INDUSTRIAL SERVICE PROGRAM TO ADDRESS THE
PROBLEMS OF TROUBLED FIRMS, THEIR WORKERS AND COMMUNITIES
It is axiomatic that some businesses die inevitable
deaths—victims of poor management, disappearing markets, or
competition from other states and countries. In many cases,
there is nothing state government can or should do. Yet the
Commission found that in some cases good manufacturing jobs
can be saved through assistance to carefully selected firms.
To that end, the Commission recommends creating the
Massachusetts Industrial Service, to be administered jointly
by the Secretary of Economic Affairs and the Secretary of
Labor. Its purpose is to improve the state's responses to
troubled-firm situations by managing them on a case-by-case
basis.
Massachusetts has already taken a first step. The
Massachusetts Economic Readjustment Team (MERT) , established
in 1983, was designed to coordinate state efforts in
potential plant closing situations. The proposed Industrial
Service builds on the foundations established by MERT, but
with more comprehensive capabilities and expanded resources.
The Industrial Service will seek to manage troubled-firm
situations through two distinct phases:
• Assistance to companies and potential buyers
aimed at preventing the demise of viable
businesses. One element of this assistance will
be an Industrial Stabilization Fund to finance
high risk corporate turnarounds and restructur-
ings.
• Assistance to workers and communities when major
businesses are lost. The Industrial Service
will coordinate the Reemployment Assistance Pro-
gram established in conjunction with the Social
Compact and described further in a subsequent
recommendation.
An Industrial Advisory Board composed of representatives
of state and local government, business, and the
Massachusetts A.F.L.-C.I.O. will provide direction and
oversight to the Industrial Service. The Board will not be
involved in the day-to-day operations of the Industrial
Service, but will advise staff on program design,
implementation, and general policy direction. The Advisory
Board is also described in a subsequent recommendation.
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Assistance la Prevent Unnecessary il£fe 1&2L2.
The first function of the Industrial Service is to try
to prevent a firm from closing when the business is viable.
The Commission clearly recognizes that some companies on the
brink of closing cannot and should not be saved. The
Commission distinguishes, however, between the company—
a
specific legal entity—and the business in which a company
may be engaged. There are cases where a business may be
viable as opposed to the company itself. For example, a
subsidiary of a corporation may be profitable, but not
profitable enough to meet parent company expectations. In
other cases, new management may be the key to a successful
turnaround. In still other cases, new owners may need to be
found to buy out a retiring owner or family unable to sell a
closely-held company. It is a primary objective of the
Industrial Service to offer, assistance in maintaining viable
businesses in these types of situations.
The key functions of this Service are to help identify
businesses facing the likelihood of serious employment loss;
help develop strategies to solve specific problems; and
suggest, coordinate, and sometimes provide resources to help
in their implementation.
In addition to potential plant closings it would respond
to the following situations:
• companies facing site specific problems which
threaten their viability or their likelihood
of remaining within the state;
• companies which could remain viable by exploit-
ing new market opportunities or improving their
production technology; and
• companies which could survive through a compre-
hensive restructuring and transfer of ownership.
For the Industrial Service to achieve its mission, it
must have the trust of the private sector. To gain that
trust the Servie must be able to respond quickly,
effectively, and confidentially when its assistance is
sought. Further, the expectations of what it is capable of
doing must match the staff and resources it has available.
To be most effective the Service must be able to
identify problems before they reach a critical stage.
It must also be able to identify quickly those instances in
which state assistance is useful, and determine appropriate
strategies for those instances.
Xhe_ Stabilization Euudi Associated with the Industrial
Service's functions of assisting firms is the creation of the
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industrial Stabilization Fund to provide flexible, high-risk
financing in corporate turnaround and buyout situations.
WhilS recognizing that financing is usually not the primary
need for companies facing serious business situations--cost-
saving measures, or new markets, management, and owners are
typically more crucial—the Commission found that in some
high risk turnaround or buyout situations, appropriate
financing can be a critical factor.
a
There are currently no generally available sources of
timely, high-risk capital for corporate restructuring. As
result, the Commission concluded that a new fund with an
initial capitalization of $2 million is needed to complete
the financing where a corporate restructuring or change of
ownership for a viable business cannot be financed entirely
from private and existing quasi-public resources. The fund
may be capitalized from appropriations, monies provided by
other quasi-public entities, Federal Economic Development
Agency Funds, or the mature industries portion of the
proposed Savings Bank Fund for economic development.
It is proposed that this Fund be governed by a Board of
Directors responsible for approving loans. This Board would
be appointed by the Governor and consist of the Secretaries
of Economic Affairs and Labor, and a majority composed of
private sector representatives who among them have financial
skills, management experience, and special expertise with
corporate turnaround situations. The Executive Director of
the Industrial Service would oversee the operations of the
Fund and work closely with the Stabilization Fund's Board of
Directors.
In considering how the Fund should be organized, the
Commission recommends the following:
• As in the case of other quasi-public finance
corporations, the Directors of the fund should
bear no personal financial liability for their
actions. Their deliberations and the loan
proposals they review should not be subject to
Freedom of Information laws, so that confiden-
tiality on the status of individual firms can
be maintained. The Governor should determine if
it is necessary to compensate the private sector
Directors in order to enlist the best people and
assure their availability to respond promptly
when necessary.
• The Board of Directors should have the power to
establish loan agreements requiring specific
operational activities, financial actions or
management changes as conditions for the receipt
of loans from the Stabilization Fund.
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• The Fund should be an extension of the Indus-
trial Service and share its staff. The
Directors should play a central role in staff
hiring.
• Although it is hoped that the Fund will be
self-financing, it is recognized that it will
intervene in high risk situations.
• The Fund is intended to supplement existing
financing sources including the MBDC, CDFC,
MCRC, the proposed Savings Bank Fund, SBA loans
and guarantees, and Community Development Block
Grant-financed low-interest loans. In most
cases the stabilization fund should be the "deal
-maker" rather than the exclusive source of
debt.
• The Directors should prepare an annual report
of their lending activities, including the im-
pact on direct and indirect employment, the
nature, location, and pay level of the jobs
created or maintained, and fiscal benefits to
the state in tax revenues and the avoidance of
social welfare expenditures. Future decisions
of the fund's level of capitalization should re-
flect this broader concept of "return on invest-
ment .
"
Worker And. Community Assistance
The second major funtion of the Industrial Service
is to marshall state resources for workers and communities
when a major business closing occurs. The existing MERT has
brought together an interagency group with representatives
from the Division of Employment Security, the Office of
Training and Employment Policy, the Executive Office of
Economic Affairs, the Executive Office of Labor, the
Executive Office of Communities and Development, and the
Governor's Office of Economic Development.
The coordination of state assistance in business
closings should continue to operate on this interagency
basis, with the Industrial Service in the coordinating role.
In the immediate aftermath of a plant closing, the
Industrial Service will oversee implementation by the
Division of Employment Security and the Office of Training
and Employment Policy of the Reemployment Assistance Program
for the affected workers. This is described in a subsequent
recommendation.
, To assist the community in formulating a longer-term
response to the plant closing, the Service will bring other
48
agency resources to bear. For example the Department of
Commerce and Development and the Governor's Office of
Economic Development might help the community market the
abandoned industrial site for productive reuse. The
Executive Office of Communities and Development and the
Governor's Office of Economic Development might work with
local leaders to plan an economic recovery strategy for the
city or town. The Executive Office of Economic Affairs, the
Executive Office of Labor, the Division of Employment
Security, and the Office of Training and Employment Policy
would work together to plan for the long-term reorientation
of the local workforce toward jobs with growing demand.
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PROMOTE THE OPTION OF "SHORT-TIME" WORK OR WORKSHARING FOR
FIRMS ANTICIPATING LAYOFFS OR PLANT CLOSINGS
The use of layoffs by firms can result in some workers
going on unemployment while others maintain full employment.
The use of "short-time" work, or worksharing, is an option
which would spread the burden of declining job demand. Under
a short-time work plan, instead of laying off some workers, a
larger group of employees within a firm or firm unit would
work reduced hours thereby sharing the decline in job hours.
Short-time workers would receive unemployment compensation in
proportion to their foregone wages.
Short-time work can benefit both employers and workers.
It helps employers keep experienced, skilled workers
available for recall. It enables workers to maintain their
work relationships with only a slightly reduced income. In
addition it enables workers notified of an upcoming permanent
layoff to maintain some income while using their non-work
time to search or train for new jobs.
There are several legal and fiscal issues related
to short-time work which need to be resolved. First, where
labor unions are involved, their consent is essential.
Second, unemployment insurance regulations need to be
modified to allow payment of partial benefits.
DES is currently examining the fiscal and legal aspects
of implementing an option for short-time work in
Massachusetts.
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ESTABLISH A SOCIAL COMPACT TO ADDRESS THE ISSUES OF WORKER
DISLOCATION
In its deliberations on how best to minimize the effects
of plant closings and massive layoffs on workers and
communities, the Commission confronted the issue of mandatory
notice legislation. Such legislation has been proposed by
organized labor for years as a way to cushion the blow
resulting from massive and unanticipated job loss. The
business community has opposed such legislation, contending
that its passage would seriously damage the state's business
climate.
The Commission first explored the magnitude of the
problem over the past two years. Staff research showed that
of the 8,500 workers who lost their jobs at the time of
a plant closing, over 40% received less than one month's
notice. Additional workers lost their jobs prior to the
final closing of some facilities. The magnitude of the
problem is small when compared to the size of the state's
workforce, but the effects of a layoff or closing can be
devastating to the workers and communities involved.
In its response to this problem the Commission pursued a
cooperative approach which could directly address the worker
and community issues without adversely affecting the state's
business climate. The approach agreed upon was a social
compact that addresses job growth as well as job loss.
Under the compact, the business community and the
government of the Commonwealth agree to work together to
improve state programs in the areas of economic development
and job training. Business enterprises agree to work with
the Commonwealth to maximize in-state plant expansions.
To minimize the disruption from plant closings and
certain partial closings, businesses agree to provide their
workers with the means to adjust to economic dislocation.
Examples of such means include notification, severance pay,
continuation of health care benefits and out-placement. Each
firm will design its own method of dealing with the problem.
The compact anticipates legislation to continue group
health care benefits for terminated workers for 90 days in
case of plant closings or certain partial closings. This
reflects the finding of the Commission that the loss of
health insurance coverage is a major problem facing
dislocated workers.
Finally, the compact provides that the state will
establish a Reemployment Assistance Program which includes
on-site placement and counseling services as well as targeted
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and expanded retraining opportunities for dislocated workers.
This program will be funded from general revenues or
additional payments into the Unemployment Insurance System by
firms with 50 or more employees, or both.
Workers who lose their jobs in major plant closings or
partial closings, who receive less than ninety days
notification and severance benefits from their former
employers, and who participate in available reemployment
programs will be eligible for supplemental unemployment
insurance benefits. (The Reemployment Assistance Program is
described in further detail in the following separate
recommendation
.
)
The compact will be marketed aggressively by the state
and its business organizations. Adoption of the compact's
voluntary standards of corporate behavior for plant closing
situations is proposed to become a prerequisite for
participation in various quasi-public business assistance
programs.
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ESTABLISH A REEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FOR WORKERS
AFFECTED BY MAJOR PLANT CLOSINGS AND CERTAIN PARTIAL CLOSINGS
The Social Compact described in the preceding
recommendation encourages companies who face plant closings
to provide every affected worker with the maximum practicable
combination of advance notification or income maintenance.
The proposed change in the group insurance law would
automatically extend existing group health insurance coverage
up to 90 days for plant closing victims.
It is agreed by all Commission members that the
principal short-term objective for these affected workers is
reemployment in jobs as comparable in earning power as
possible to those that were lost. For this purpose the
Commission recommends the creation of a Reemployment
Assistance Program which will combine an intensified,
customized infusion of job counseling, placement, and
training services from the Division of Employment Security
and the JTPA system with a supplemental unemployment
insurance benefit for certain eligible workers. The expanded
employment services would be funded through general revenues;
the supplemental unemployment benefits would be funded
through general revenues in 1985 and in subsequent years
either through general revenues or by additional payments
into the Unemployment Insurance System by firms with 50 or
more employees, or both.
Expanded Employment services
The components of the program will include:
• Worker Assistance Centers - National exper-
ience with dislocated workers has confirmed the
effectiveness of emergency assistance centers
set up at the site of a major layoff or
closing. The Massachusetts Dislocated Workers
Task Force identified on-site centers as a
major part of the state's efforts to assist
dislocated workers, and this approach has been
used in such recent closings as Parker Brothers,
Revere Sugar, and the ECA Corporation.
However, existing JTPA Title III funds are
not sufficient for establishing both on-going
centers throughout the state and emergency on-
site centers in cases of large-scale
dislocation.
• Improved Retraining Programs - Funding levels
.
for retraining programs under JTPA for 1984
included monies from fiscal year 1983. Because
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dislocated worker programs are a relatively new
area for the Commonwealth's employment and
training system, the financing for what amounts
to experimental programs has been sufficient so
far. Next year, however, JTPA funds are not
likely to be sufficient to meet anticipated
needs and must be supplemented with state funds.
Well designed programs in areas heavily
impacted by plant closings will serve not only
the immediately impacted workers but poten-
tially other workers who are dislocated as a
result of the ripple effects of the major
closing.
Reemployment Assistance Benefits
To help workers dislocated by major closings and
certain partial closings adjust to the loss of their jobs and
undertake the effort to find new employment, the Unemployment
Insurance System will provide a supplemental benefit during
the adjustment period. When combined with normal
unemployment insurance benefits this supplemental benefit
will bring workers a maximum of 75% of their pre-termination
gross wage, up to a cap of $97 in weekly supplemental
benefits. The cap will be adjusted in the same manner as
basic unemployment insurance benefits are adjusted to reflect
changes in the state's average wage.
During 1985, the benefits will be available to workers
who lose their jobs in a closing in which 90% or more of the
workers are permanently laid off from a specific facility
which employs 50 people or more. Workers employed by private
for-profit and non-profit employers at facilities that have
been located in Massachusetts for one year or more are
covered. To receive the supplemental benefits, an employee
must be eligible for unemployment insurance, and participate
in the reemployment programs made available by the Division
of Employment Security and JTPA.
Because many firms, in the spirit of the Social Compact,
will provide workers with advance notification and/or
severance benefits, thereby having the desired effect in
"cushioning" the shock of massive worker dislocation, the
supplemental unemployment insurance benefits will be prorated
downward to reflect any notification and/or severance package
provided by the firm.
Prior to January 1, 1986, the Director of the Division
of Employment Security, in consultation with the Industrial
Advisory Board, will identify and assess various categories
of partial plant closings. Specifically, the following
research issues will be examined:
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• What is a partial plant closing?
- staggered layoffs
- permanent product line or process discontin-
uation
- elimination of a shift
- division shutdown
- percentage of workforce reduction
- other
• Relocation of a plant
• Permanent layoff definition:
- when does an indefinite layoff become
permanent?
- when does a phased permanent layoff become a
plant closing?
• Possible special treatment of LMA's with very
high unemployment rates.
• Other
Effective January 1, 1986, the Director of DES will by
regulation identify those partial closings that are deemed by
the Director, in consultation with the Industrial Advisory
Board, to warrant the same state response as a full plant
closing. Workers who lose their jobs in the partial closings
covered by these regulations shall be eligible for the
supplemental unemployment benefits previously described,
subject to appropriation.
The Commission believes that these Reemployment
Assistance measures will help not only individual workers and
their families but entire communities which would otherwise
have to absorb overnight the loss of aggregate purchasing
power represented by major cutbacks in employment.
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INSTITUTE A STATE LEVEL ECONOMIC MONITORING CAPABILITY TO
ENABLE POLICYWORKERS TO FOLLOW CHANGING TRENDS IN THE STATE'S
ECONOMY
The first step in structuring a long-term economic
development strategy is understanding trends and identifying
opportunities in the economy. This requires the development
of a comprehensive data base on the state's economy,
emphasizing trends by industry and by geographic region.
The state has substantial research capabilities within
various agencies on which to build. The Division of
Employment Security maintains comprehensive data at the firm
and industry levels on wages, employment, and occupational
structure. Industrial and occupational projections are done
annually on a limited scale. Other state agencies including
Administration and Finance and the Department of Commerce
collect different types of data and perform forecasting of
the state's economy. However, these data bases are largely
uncoordinated and their value is considerably less than the
sum of the parts. Furthermore, federal budget cutbacks have
reduced the level of analysis that these agencies are able to
undertake.
Beyond the collection of data, there is a need for
enriching the statistical base through interviews with
corporate officials, industry specialists, and
representatives of communities. This "outreach" component
will help the state further understand reasons for the
decline and expansion of certain industries and regions and
what to expect in the future.
The following summarizes the Commission's
recommendations to improve present research capabilities in
the state:
• Supplement the existing state data base to
include more detailed regional employment and
industry projections, an expansion of wage data
by specific occupations, export data informa-
tion, information on new technologies as they
affect occupational and industry structures and
an expansion of the data base on labor supply in
the state.
• Increase the number and extent of industry
studies to include the analysis of specific
industries which are key to the state or
specific regions of the state in order to deter-
mine their future viability, opportunities and
potential problems.
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• Increase the scope of regional studies to
include the identification of a specific
region's economy and resources.
Obviously, the type of work outlined above is of no
purpose unless it is used to promote economic development.
Such work could be used in several ways:
• Creation of a Data fifiojj.: This state unlike
many others does not currently have a compila-
tion of basic statistical information on its
economy. One should be assembled.
• Development oj. 4 More Aggressive Outreach
Program to Industry ; The information collected
under several of the projects described above
should enable both state and local officials to
provide a more coherent and positive picture of
the state and selected regions within it.
• identification al Special Opportunities,
Problems and Needs ; The work of the monitoring
group should be geared to the identification of
ways in which the state can respond to the
constantly changing nature of the Commonwealth's
economy. This group should have a working
relationship with those agencies of state
government which can translate those needs and
opportunities into effective programs.
A state economic monitoring function would not require a
large build-up of staff. What is more important than numbers
is the quality of the staff and the interrelationship between
this group and existing agencies. Such a group should report
directly to the Secretary of Economic Affairs.
The monitoring group must to some extent be flexible and
demand-responsive. Its work should complement and coordinate
rather, than replace work currently being conducted in various
agencies. It- will thus supplement existing work and provide
an important resource for all state agencies, quasi-public
institutions and community groups involved in economic
development and employment policy.
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IMPROVE THE PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING SYSTEM AND
TIE IT MORE CLOSELY TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS
In its efforts to understand public sector employment
and training programs, the Commission found a large, complex
and confusing system. This is in large part due to the lack
of a national employment and training strategy and the
newness of the effort to create one at the state level.
While this Commission was not charged with addressing the
overall employment and training system, it did have a concern
with the system's ability to serve workers dislocated by the
decline of mature industries.
Under the new JTPA mechanism, a state-wide Job Training
Coordinating Council and a series of 16 regional Private
Industry Councils have been established to plan and
coordinate employment and training strategies. The
Commission identified a number of issues for these bodies to
address as the system takes shape.
The first is to more fully utilize the Private Industry
Councils as local service coordinators. The Commonwealth has
a number of training programs and resources in place,
including community college programs, regional
vocational/technical schools, the Bay State Skills
Corporation, Department of Public Welfare training programs,
and apprenticeship programs. The current system is
fragmented and many community-based training resources are
underutilized. In addition unnecessary duplication of
training services may be occur ing. In particular in the
community and state college system, certain programs operated
by vocational/technical schools and apprenticeship programs
could and should be better utilized by local Service Delivery
Areas.
The implementation of the JTPA with Private Industry
Councils as the coordinative mechanism offers an opportunity
to coordinate all employment and training programs and
integrate services to disadvantaged and dislocated workers.
This would insure that federal and state training dollars are
more efficiently utilized. Furthermore the coordination of
program development between the JTPA system and educational
institutions begun under the JTPA education grant can assist
schools in the adoption of training programs to meet the
needs of dislocated workers.
In particular the PICs should be required to sign off on
all public sector education and training programs in their
respective regions. Such a process would in no way affect
the funding mechanisms now in place. It would however
centralize all information about education and training
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programs, eliminate duplication and allow for easier
identification of program needs not currently being met.
In addition the PICs should create clearinghouses for
information on local labor markets. The purpose of the
clearinghouses would be to collect and distribute specific
information on locally available employment and training
services and funding sources for programs and economic
development strategies that may affect labor supply and
demand in their areas.
At the state level there should be additional efforts to
make labor market information easily accessible and useable.
This can be accomplished through many means, including the
addition of contact people on all disseminated reports,
reformatting existing information, and supplementing it with
information which is currently collected but not
disseminated. With the growing emphasis on dislocated
workers, some attention must be given to more accurately
identifying who these people are and what their needs are.
With over 50% business representation, the Private
Industry Councils are a valuable resource in understanding
the needs and opportunities in their areas. It is the
responsibility of public sector organizations to make sure
they make it as easy and valuable as possible for businesses
to participate at both the program design and implementation
phases of these programs. Training programs that have the
highest success in adequately preparing and placing
participants are those in which employers are directly
involved.
Firm-based training is especially important in
traditional industries when employee skills are outmoded by
the introduction of a new technology. Ideally, firms should
make a financial commitment to the training program and
participate in program planning and operation. Models
include the Bay State Skills Corporation's skills training
contracts, the apprenticeships monitored by the Division of
Apprentice Training, on-the-job-training projects under JTPA,
and cooperative education programs at the state colleges.
Increased public/private efforts in this area require
additional outreach by the state to the private sector and a
better understanding of their needs. The recently
established Partnership Center in the Office of Training and
Employment Policy has begun to address some of these issues.
It has also begun to broaden the scope of public sector
ventures to increase the money available to the employment
and training system.
Finally, employment and training efforts should be
better linked to economic development efforts. Some of the
economic development mechanisms used to assist expanding as
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well as faltering firms and industries can be used directly
to help dislocated workers. The Commission joins with the
Dislocated Worker's Task Force in recommending that formal
linkages and referral systems be established between economic
development and employment and training agencies. The
following are some proposals for developing such linkages:
• Firms that receive assistance from state
funding agencies should be approached to make
commitments to hiring goals for dislocated
workers before publicly advertising job
openings.
• State funding agencies and communities
receiving economic development funding should
target for assistance those firms which would
create a net increase in jobs, as well as firms
which would create jobs that pay wages well
above the minimum and provide full benefits.
• The Commerce Department should tie local
employment and training resources to its SITE
program, so that companies interested in loca-
ting in a Massachusetts community can learn of
these resources. Information systems such as
the one being implemented by the state of Maine
should be considered for their applicability in
Massachusetts.
• The state should support the Cooperative Regional
Industrial Laboratories. This new experimental
program developed by the Department of Labor and
the Executive Office of Economic Affairs is
aimed at generating new employment opportunities
for special groups of displaced workers. The
CRIL considers a skilled labor force as a
regional asset. The goal of the CRIL project is
to establish a regional cooperative effort among
managers, workers, government, educational
institutions and communities to identify new
employment-generating enterprises or opportu-
nities. The first CRIL project has been
established with skilled machine tool opera-
tors in the Greenfield area. Plans exist to
develop CRIL projects with other groups. More
flexible resources are needed to provide funds
for follow-up and implementation of the oppor-
tunities identified in the first stage of the
CRIL process.
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ESTABLISH AN INDUSTRIAL ADVISORY BOARD
The Commission's formal existence will end with the
publication of this report. However the work of implementing
its recommendations through both legislative and
administrative action will just be beginning. To help state
government shape and monitor the implementation of these new
measures and to provide a useful sounding board for other
ideas which may arise, we close with a recommendation that an
Industrial Advisory Board be established.
The Advisory Board should be co-chaired by the
Secretaries of Economic Affairs and Labor, and should include
representation from the sectors represented on this
Commission: business, the Massachusetts A.F.L.-C.I.O.
,
academic economists, and community leadership.
Beyond providing general advice to the Governor and
Legislature on job growth and loss issues, the Advisory Board
should:
• oversee the development of the Massachusetts
Industrial Service as it begins its work and
faces difficult resource allocation issues;
• follow the implementation of the Social Compact
as it becomes operative in the coming months;
and
• review data assembled through the proposed
economic monitoring capability and help shape
proposed industry-wide assistance initiatives as
discussed in earlier recommendations.
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THE SOCIAL COMPACT
INTRODUCTION
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts, its businessees, its
workers, its labor organizations, and its communities have a
common desire to improve the economic lives of our citizens.
The cooperative efforts of all parties are essential to meet
two fundamental economic goals:
• to create and retain jobs throughout Massachu-
setts, especially in areas of chronically high
unemployment; and
• to cushion the impact on workers, their
families, and their communities when major dis-
locations of employment occur.
Paramount in achieving these goals is the maintenance of
a sound economic climate in Massachusetts. Business and
government agree to promote such a climate by working
together to enhance the fiscal competitiveness of our
Commonwealth and by pledging to resolve economic issues in a
cooperative, rather than adversarial, manner.
In addition, business and government agree to pursue
three specific strategies to create and retain job growth and
cushion the effects of job losses:
e government and business will target and combine
their resources to help existing firms that are
viable and to encourage new start-ups and expan-
sions
• businesses that anticipate or experience a major
dislocation of employment agree to abide by the
standards of responsible corporate behavior out-
lined in this compact; and
• the Commonwealth will provide targeted assis-
tance to workers and communities impacted by a
major dislocation of employment.
STANDARDS OP CORPORATE BEHAVIOR
The parties to this compact recognize that no matter how
effectively we work together to prevent the loss of viable
companies, some major dislocations of employment will and
must occur. We also recognize that different circumstances
call for different responses when a plant closing or major,
permanent layoff appears imminent and that most
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Massachusetts firms are corporate citizens who will act
responsibly when major dislocations are inevitable.
While the standards of appropriate corporate behavior
outlined in this section of the compact are understood to be
voluntary, they constitute a good-faith pledge of actual
behavior by the companies that adopt this compact.
Businesses that recognize a threat to their on-going
viability or their ability to provide employment will utilize
any form of state assistance they deem practicable and
appropriate in exploring alternatives for stabilizing the
company and retaining employment.
When a plant closing or partial closing is imminent,
businesses recognize that the needs of workers and affected
communities must be considered alongside the needs of the
affected firm. Advance notice is encouraged because it is
generally valuable to workers and communities in preparing to
cope with major job losses. However, significant advance
notice is not always possible or appropriate and other
provisions can often provide an equivalent benefit to
dislocated workers and impacted communities.
Therefore, Massachusetts businesses agree to provide
every employee affected by a major plant closing or a major,
permanent layoff with the maximum practicable combination of
the following:
• the longest practicable advance notice in cases
where notice is possible and appropriate; and/or
• maintenance of income and health insurance
benefits.
Firms are also encouraged to assist workers in other
ways, such as a corporate commitment to help re-employ or
out-place affected workers.
While no minimum standard of notice is prescribed for
these corporate responses, the Commonwealth, in designing the
public responses outlined below, has been guided by the
approximate time workers need to adjust to termination and
find new employment - 90 days. The Commonwealth similarly
expects firms to provide at least 90 days 1 notice and/or
equivalent benefits whenever possible.
In those situations where firms choose to provide income
maintenance, it is suggested that employees be provided with
one week's pay for each year of service up to a maximum of 12
weeks, with a minimum of two weeks pay for employees who have
worked for the company for at least one year.
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MAINTENANCE OP HEALTH INSURANCE
Subject to pending legislation, employer group health
insurance policies will provide 90 days* extended coverage to
employees who lose their jobs in plant closings and certain
partial closings.
REEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE
The Commonwealth will establish a "Reemployment
Assistance Program" to respond to major plant closings and
some partial closings, subject to later definition. (In
1985, the program will cover permanent cessations of business
activity affecting at least 90% of the workforce at
facilities employing 50 persons or more.)
Appropriate funding sources for this program may include
general revenues and employer contributions to the
unemployment insurance system.
The program will provide the follwoing benefits for
eligible workers:
e assistance in maintaining existing health
insurance coverage until reemployment to a
limit of 90 days after termination, for
workers not covered by their employer, union,
or family.
e significant expansion of dislocated worker
counseling and reemployment programs
e for participants in dislocated worker programs,
a supplemental unemployment insurance benefit
available until re-employment to a limit of
90 days; this income adjustment shall be re-
duced proportionally by any combination of
advance notification and/or income maintenance
provided an employee by his employer.
To the degree that the fund is supported by employer
unemployment insurance contributions the fund may offer a
rebate or credit to employers who in response to an actual
closing or major, permanent layoff, provide significant
advance notification and/or income maintenance.
ACCPEPTANCE OP THIS COMPACT
The Commonwealth and the business community will work
together to encourage firms throughout Massachusetts to adopt
this compact and embrace its standards of corporate behavior.
The Commonwealth will make the standards of corporate
behavior outlined in this compact an essential element of all
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financing agreements between user companies with 50 or more
employees and the Massachusetts Industrial Finance Agency,
the Massachusetts Technology Development Corporation, and the
Massachusetts Community Development Finance Corporation, and
the Massachusetts Government Land Bank. The funding
resources of these agencies shall be available for use by
companies participating in this compact.
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EXHIBIT 1
Structure of the Commonwealth's Economy: Distribution of Jobs by Major Sector
1950 1965 1974 1982
Construction 4.2Z 4.3Z 3.8Z 3.0%
Manufacturing 40. 7Z 33. 1Z 27. 2Z 24. 3Z
(Mature Industries) (34. 8Z)* (25. 5Z) (19. 3Z) (15.17.)
Transportation & Public
Utilities 6.7Z 5.2Z 5.3Z 4.6Z
Wholesale & Retail Trade 20. 1Z 20. 7Z 22. 1Z 21. 9Z
Finance, Insurance &
Real Estate 4.4Z 5.4% 5.8Z 6.4Z
Services Including
Mining 12. 1Z 17.3% 20. 8Z 25. 9Z
Government 11.8% 13.8% 15. 1Z 14. 1Z
TOTAL 100. 0Z 100.0% 100.0% 100. 0Z
Total in Thousands 1,757.1 2,015.8 2,353.7 2,638.0
* Estimated.
Source: Massachusetts Division of Employment Security: 790 Series
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EXHIBIT 3
Regional Employment
Manufacturing Jobs in Selected Industries
80%
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EXHIBIT 4
Manufacturing Employment in Massachusetts
1982
DURABLE GOODS 61.
8
2
Lumber and Furniture 1.8Z
Stone, Clay and Glass 1.8Z
Primary Metals 2.4Z
Fabricated Metals 7.5Z
Non-Electrical Machinery 16. 4
Z
Electrical Machinery 17. 42
Transportation Equipment 5.2Z
Instruments 9.3Z
NON-DURABLE GOODS 38.22
Food and Kindred Products 3.8Z
Textile Mill Products 3.2Z
Apparel 5 . 92
Paper and Allied Products 4.1Z
Printing and Publishing 7.2Z
Chemicals 2.7Z
Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastics 4.7%
Leather and Leather Products 2.9Z
Miscellaneous Manufacturing* 3. 72
100.02
TOTAL MANUFACTURING EMPLOYMENT (000s) 640.1
* As of 1984, miscellaneous manufacturing will
be moved to the durable goods category.
Totals do not sum due to rounding.
Source: Massachusetts Division of Employment
Security: 790 Series
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EXHIBIT 6
Massachusetts Employment Trends by Manufacturing Industries
sic INDUSTIT 1930 1965 1970 * 1975 * 1980
INDEX: 1950 - 100
1983*
32 Stone, Clay & Class 100 107 124 107 128 112
33 Prlaary Hacals 100 91 74 69 77 65
34 Fabricated Macala 100 113 139 127 138 118
35 Machinery except Flaccrlcal 100 113 104 111 165 151
36 Elaccric and Electronic 100 134 141 125 167 168
Equip—nt
37 Transportation Equipment 100 135 146 118 139 138
38 Instruments 100 159 219 244 327 317
20 food 4 Kindred Products 100 84 70 58 55 48
22 TextIlea 100 33 28 21 22 17
23 Apparel 100 99 84 72 69 62
26 Paper Products 100 111 106 35 86 79
27 Printing • Publishing 100 114 125 110 120 128
28 Hi—li el i 100 109
•
127 119 HI 99
30 lubber fc Plastics 100 123 109 91 100 98
31 Leather Products 100 67 48 32 30 22
39 Mlscallsneoua 100 83 81 74 82 64
TOTAL KA1RJ?ACTU1ING
EMPLOYMENT (thousanda)
715.7 668.2 648.: 577.8 674.9 624.3
* Secession Tears
Source: Massachusetts Division of Employment Security: 790 Series
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EXHIBIT 8
Public Funding for Employment and Training Programs in Massachusetts
Fiscal Year 1984
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCT/ PROGRAMS TOTAL FVN'PS ALLOCATED
POTENTIAL FUNDS
FOR DISLOCATED WORKERS
DIVISION OF E^PLO'iMENT
SECURITY
Unemployment Insurance Program
(Administration only, does not
Include benefits paid to
claimants)
Employment Service (adminis-
tration)
Trade Adjustment Assistance
Program
Emergency Veterans Employment
Jobs Ace
531. 6 nllllon
$24.4 alll loa
5390.000 (JTPA-Tltle
III funds for sixteen
Employment Service
workers to help only dis-
located workers).
5670,000 (fiscal year
1983)
Unspecified amount avail-
able to states on first
come, first served basis
Amount unknown, dependent on
proportion of program recipients
who are dislocated workers.
Same as above.
5390,000 (slready accounted for
under JTPA-Tltle III funds).
5670,000 (fiscal year 1983)
Aaount unknown, dependent on
the nunber of program eligible
people who are also dislocated
workers.
DEPARTMENT OF XASPPtfEl
DEVELOPMENT
JTPA-Tltle IZa (disadvantaged
workers) of which:
Distributed Directly to SDAs/
PICa
Governor's Discretionary Funds
Title III (dislocated workers)
$29.3 nllllon of which:
522.8 alllloo
$6.5 Billion
$2.3 nllllon $1.3 allllon with some local
matching In the form of in-kind
services.
prvTsiow or occupatiosal
EPUCATIObT
Allocation for Adult Training
Programs of which:
Adult Short-Term Training
Grants
Allocations to communities for
vocational training (secondary
schools Including regional
vocational schools).
Allocations to public community
colleges
Apprentice training
Displaced Bonemakers Program
Programs for Incarcerated
adults
$4.78 allllon of which:
$975,640
$1.7 allllon
$1.25 allllon
$400,000
5200,000
5250.000
Amount unknown, dependent on
proportion of clients who are
dislocated workers
Amount unknown, dependent on
proportion of clients who are
dislocated workers.
75
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY/ PROGRAMS
EXHIBIT 8
(continued)
TOTAL FUNDS ALLOCATED
POTENTIAL FUNDS
FOR DISLOCATED WORKERS
BAT STATE SKILLS CORPORATION
Cranes allocated to providers
of which:
Skills training contraces
Supported Work Program for
the mentally retarded
Displaced Romeaakers
Programs for welfare recipi-
ents.
Unallocated Funds fiscal
year 1983
$3.95 a 11 lion of which:
$1.5 million (requires
•quel aatch froa firms)
$1.1 ail lion
$550,000
$800,000 (allocated by
the Deparcaent of Public
Welfare)
$600,000
Aaount unknown, dependent on
proportion of clients who are
dislocated workers.
$600,000 say be targeted to
dislocated workers
BOARD OF REGENTS
Vocation-related training
prograas, run by fifteen
community colleges
Tuition Valvar Program
for unemployed workers
$54 million (represents
64Z of the total alloca-
tion to coeaunicy
colleges, which is an
estimated amount used
for vocation-related
degree programs)
.
$1.0 million
Aaount unknown, dependent oa
proportion of students who are
dislocated workers.
Aaount unknown, dependent on
proportion of program partici-
pants who are dislocated workers.
DIVISION Or APPRENTICE
TRAINING
6200-6300 individual
apprenticeships in firms
throughout Massachusetts.
$400,000 (through Divi-
sion of Occupational
Education)
Aaount unknown, dependent on
proportion of apprentices who are
dislocated workers.
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE
Federal Work Incentive (WHO
Demonstration Program.
S19.2S ollllon Amount unknown, dependent on
proportion of program partici-
pants.
DEPARTMENT OF ELDER AFFAIRS
Senior Aids Program.
Elder Service Corps.
SI. 8 allllon
$792,000
Aaount unknown, dependent on
proportion of progran partici-
pants who are dislocated workers.
DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENT
Eaployaent and Training
Services for public housing
residents.
$2,325 allllon (allocated
to eleven municipal
housing authorities to
contract for services.
Aaount unknown, dependent oa
proportion of program partici-
pants who are dislocated workers.
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INDIVIDUAL POINTS OF CONCERN
The Commission's recommendations reflect the consensus
reached after months of discussion on the wide range of
issues affecting mature industries. On certain
recommendations, however, individual Commission members still
have points of concern. These are raised in the attached
letters they submitted for inclusion in the report.
77

FEDERAL RESERVE BANK
OF BOSTON
.rw 4)984
LYNN C. BROWN
C
VICC »»K*IOKNT AND KCONOMIST
BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS 02106
June 1, 1984
Mr. Ben Kincannon
Governor's Coaniseion on the
Future of Mature Industries
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts
Executive Office of Economic Affairs
One Ashburton Place - Room 2101
Boston, MA 02108
Dear Ben:
While I aa in agreement with the general thrust of the recommendations of
the Governor's Commission on the Future of Mature Industries, I am concerned
with the reemployment assistance portion of the Compact* In particular, I
fear that providing workers who have lost their jobs through a plant closing
with a supplemental unemployment insurance benefit discriminates among
individuals in essentially similar circumstances and creates perverse
incentives*
The availability of the supplemental benefit depends upon the individual
being a victim of a plant closing and not his personal circumstances* In
particular, it is not related to the difficulty the individual will encounter
in finding re-employment. There is an implicit assumption that a victim of a
plant closing will have greater difficulty than someone who loses his job for
other reasons* This assumption seems to be based on the perception that
closings tend to be large relative to the size of the local labor market*
However, this is not necessarily the case* I find it Inequitable that someone
who loses his job in a 50-person plant closing in the Boston area is eligible
for benefits, while 200 people permanently laid off in an Athoi or North Adams
would not receive benefits* Rather than tying supplemental benefits to plant
closings, I would prefer to see them related to the unemployment rate in the
local community or characteristics of the unemployed, such as tenure with
employer*
I am also afraid that the provision of supplemental benefits to those who
have not received notice of a plant closing will encourage firms to withold
formal notice so as to enable their workers to collect these benefits*
Furthermore, unless accompanied by dislocated worker employment and training
programs that have real substance and that require vigorous job search, the
79
provision of a supplemental benefit may encourage workers to delay seeking
re-employment. It is important to recognize that the bulk of unemployment
benefits are not subject to tax, so that the reduction in after tax income in
the first months of unemployment may be quite small . Coupled with the
workers' natural reluctance to change Industries or locations, this may
discourage job search.
These are, of course, my personal views and should not be taken to
represent those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston or the Federal Reserve
System*
Sincerely,
Lynn E. Browne
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HlfiilFS
Ejeicuhw offic** Boston, Mataackuflt* OStOI
June 11, 1984
Commissioner Ronald Ansin
Mr. George Carpenter
Chancellor Joseph Duffey
Governor's Commission on the
Future of Mature Industries
Office of Economic Affairs
Suite 602
The Saltonstall Building
100 Cambridge Street
Boston, MA 02202
Dear Co-Chairmen:
I have asked that this letter be attached to the report of the
Commission. Although I am pleased with the general work of the
Commission, and the unanimous concern for the displaced worker
that resulted in the Social Compact, I do have several concerns
about the report.
I am troubled by the underlying notion which runs through most of
the report that mature industry jobs can be saved, with the
proper infusion of government assistance. I would prefer that
the emphasis instead be placed on the social needs required to
ease workers through the transition which inevitably will take
place as many mature employment opportunities change to as yet
unimagined ones.
Although the report talks in terms of mature manufacturing
industries, its recommendations and compact presumably apply to
all employers - service industries, educational institutions,
hospitals and retailers. While its content is right and just,
its lack of clarity becomes important when denying access for
certain financing to nonsignatory firms. For example, I assume
"50 persons" means fifty full-time equivalents, but that is not
made clear.
I am also uneasy that we may be "cutting off our noses." If an
employer chooses not to sign the compact, but by personnel
policy, assurances from the Chairman or some other statement,
indicates it intends to follow appropriate standards of corporate
behavior, I would argue that is sufficient. We may be denying
financing to the very employer who could generate jobs in a key
area or project.
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Commissioner Ansin
Mr. Carpenter
Chancellor Duffey
PAGE 2
June 11, 1984
As expressed at many Commission meetings, a plant closing in
Boston is less devastating to the community and the worker than
one in high unemployment area. I would have preferred that the
state have the flexibility to give extra assistance to those
latter workers only.
The procedural delays and resulting high costs of workers
compensation payments have been listed in the Massachusetts
Business Roundtable's Agenda as a major reason why our industries
are disadvantaged in competition with those in other states. Our
worker's compensation problems are well documented and affect our
workers as negatively as our mature industries. The solution to
this problem lies squarely in the hands of our elected officials.
In my view, the Commission's report missed an opportunity by not
urging the prompt resolution of the workers compensation dilemna.
Until this is done, manufacturing and other labor intensive
businesses will have high expenses, reducing capital and profits
available for further investment, and Massachusetts employers
will be reluctant to hire the very worker population most
affected by a plant closing.
Finally, the AFL-CIO does not represent all Massachusetts
organized workers, and represents only a small percentage of the
total Massachusetts workforce. It should therefore not be
automatically designated to represent Massachusetts employees on
newly created boards.
The Commission did not have the time to establish cost estimates
for the recommendations, or a cost-benefit analysis of each. I
trust the Legislature and Executive branches will perform these
functions, as for any other legislative and regulatory proposals.
>§incerely yours,
f-Marie Driscoll
Vice President and Counsel
/
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TOM GALLAOHER
REPRESENTATIVE
18TM SUFFOLK DISTRICT
89 ALDIE STRUT
ALLSTON. MA 02194
TEC 2S4-9799
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
•TATE MOUSE. BOSTON 02133
COMMittM* on
UlKOtiOR
Housing ond Urbon Oov«»op«on»
Tcuolton
ROOM 4730. STATE HOUSE
TEL. 722*2070
RAYMOND DOOLEY
ADMINISTRATIVC AMIBTANT
Ronald Ansin, Co-Chairman
George Carpenter, Co-Chairman
Joseph Duff ay, Co-Chairman
Tha Governor's Commission on tha Futura of
Matura Industrias
100 Cambridga Straat-Room 602
Boston, MA
Gantlaman:
•A small problam in saarch of a small solution-
F>;3 Draft Raport of tha Governor's
Commission on
tha Futura of Matura Industries.
-Tha Commonwealth recognizes that _ the best remedy
for a
plant closing is a plant opening."
P. 2 Compact, ibid.
If I could choose two quotes from the Commission's
Draft
ich characterize the Commission's approach to
the
plant closings" it would be those cited
Report wh
issues surrounding
above.
The "small problem- mentality has led us to a
severely
circumscribed set of recommendations. The -best
remedy-
statement is a verbatim repetition of a slogan used by
one of
the state's most prominent business associations
in its
arguments against mandatory notification of layoffs.
Its
inclusion is indicative of the Commission's willingness to
embrace such arguments without examining their merits.
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-2-
But before going any further allow me to state that my
my purpose is not to oppose the thrust of the Draft Report,
but merely to indicate my disappointment with the extent to
which the Commission has chosen to limit itself.
Specifically, I think that the extension of
hospitalization benefits for the unemployed is an excellent
proposal. The proposed Industrial Service represents a
promising new direction for state activity. The financing
programs appear to be worthwhile experiments. And even the
limited Reemployment Assistance Program has the merit of
guaranteeing benefits to some employees who would not be
guaranteed them under the bill which I have sponsored
requiring notice of layoffs as a matter of law.
This last point bears closer scrutiny. The Commission's
proposal calls for a fund to provide these benefits which
would be paid for either by the general public or by the
business community as a whole.
The bill which I have sponsored for the past three years
involves no cost whatsoever, except to specific companies whih
fail to give the specified notice of layoffs.
I introduced that bill as a redraft of an earlier bill
which included severance benefits to all employees subject to
large layoffs paid by the company.
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-3-
I introduced the redraft not because I did not believe
in such benefits, but in response to the "business
community's" primary objection to the bill at that time that
it would increase the cost of doing business in
Massachusetts.
When that objection was removed the opponents fell back
upon the intangible argument that the new bill would still
somehow hurt the states "business climate", as alluded to in
the Draft Report.
It is ironic that the bill's opponents would now prefer
an approach which does involve costs to one which doesn't—as
long as those costs mv socialized over the general
population rather than charged to the offending party.
From a public policy standpoint it is difficult to
justify not at least attempting to collect costs associated
with an abrupt layoff from the responsible company.
But that would, of course imply that said company be
required to give advance notice of its layoff intentions.
But since the day of the announcement of the Commission's
formation at the same hearing of the legislative Commerce and
Labor Committee at which Secretary Evelyn Murphy pronounced
that, "There is no doubt a competitive disadvantage would
occur...The state's competitive edge would be quite damaged
by this bill", the administration's representatives on the
Commission looked for a way to avoid the alleged "business
climate" problems.
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They were undaunted in their search despite the
occurence of a rather remarkable event in late February.
At that time the Chairman of the above-mentioned
business association announced v^ry publicly that because of
displeasure with our state's taxation policies his company
had cancelled a planned in-state expansion, substituting for
it a move to Maine— the only state in the union with a
substantial "advance notice" requirement.
This would have seemed an event destined to provoke a
serious inquiry into the objective economic basis of the
"negative business climate" argument. No such inquiry was
undertaken because the argument was treated not as a economic
one, but as a political one-in other words-a threat to make
life difficult for the administration.
The response instead has been a "Voluntary Social
Compact" with an incentive system designed to induce
compliance. To the extent that the compact is voluntary, I
believe that it is essentially meaningless. Some companies
will give notice if they find it convenient or just-but then
they can do that right now.
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Insofar as the compact is an incentive tysttm, we must
consider whether tha incentive* of access to quasi -public
agency funding are adequate to the task. The Commission's
deliberations were conducted, to the best of my knowledge, in
a total vacuum of information as to how many firms or
employees fell into the pool served by the state's quasi-
public agencies.
But even if we knew how many companies this incentive
might induce to sign the "social compact", the question
becomes one of compliance. The only disincentive to non-
compliance is the Commonwealth's refusal to grant future funds from
the quasi-public agencies to such companies in the future
until such time as any costs incurred by the state av
repaid.
But we must ask-are such companies wry likely to again
apply for such funds? To cite just two of the more
publicized closings to occur during the Commission's
existence, would denial of future quasi-public funds have
changed the behavior of Revere Sugar or Schraffts in
Charlastown?
In my opinion the "Social Compact" does not represent a
serious contribution to the solution of the sudden layoff
problem. It may be argued that it need not do so since the
Reemployment Assistance Program will take care of at least
the bulk of the most severely affected employees.
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But this ignores half of the problem entirely. To quote
the Draft Report on pages 17-18-
"Concern over the provision of notice of closings grows
out of two points. The first is that with time, it is
sometimes possible to find ways to turn the company
around and maintain the business or find a new company
to take its place. The second point is that workers
need time to adjust to unemployment both psychologically
and financially."
If, in fact, the "Social Compact" is as meaningless as I
have claimed, then the first point will not have been dealt
with at all and an opportunity to make truly effective
the newly proposed Industrial Service will be passed up.
Two last points. In a paper which Senator D'Amico and
I submitted to the Commission we suggested that the
Commonwealth seek to enter into "no raiding compacts" with
other states.
Under this proposal two or more states would mutually
forego the use of their quasi-public agencies or other forms
of public assistance for the purpose of luring industries
from other states which were signatories to such a compact.
This would offer a mechanism by which the Commonwealth
might seek to extricate itself from what has been termed a
"second war between the states" which results in a downward
spiral of state revenue sources. The Draft Report makes no
mention of this approach.
88
-7-
And finally, the rtctnt flap ovtr the large remuneration
given to certain executives of the Ford Motor Company has
focussed public attention upon the inequities of corporate
salaries. The Reagan Administration itself has acknowledged
the destabilizing effects of such inequities upon the
workforce and public confidence.
As the Commonwealth proposes to establish new sources of
public funding for private corporations, it ought to include
stipulations regarding maximum salary levels for state
assisted ventures.
I would appreciate your including this letter in the
Commission's report.
TOM GALLAGHER
State Representative
CC: Ben Kincannon
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Josh Posner
34 Lancaster Street
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02140
June 11, 1984
Ronald Ansin
George Carpenter
Joseph Duffey
Co-Chairmen
Governor's Commission on the Future of Mature Industries
100 Cambridge Street
Boston, MA
Dear Co-Chairmen
:
I believe that the recommendations of the Commission are
useful and important steps toward improving the prospects for
economic growth with fairness in Massachusetts. I write,
however, to express a serious concern that these steps not be
misunderstood to be a full solution the problems our
Commission was asked to address. We have done some good work,
but the public's expectations should not be raised too much.
Certainly there are limits to what a state can accomplish in
this area. But there is more to do before we can reasonably
say that we have fully dealt with the future of mature
industries in the Commonwealth.
Th£ Conmafcl
The primary accomplishment of the Commission is the
recommendation of a voluntary compact between business and
government on a new standard of corporate behavior towards
workers and communities in the event of a plant closing or a
major layoff. This issue had reached a political boiling
point in the Spring of 1983 and was the primary reason why
the Commission was created to begin with. Not surprisingly,
this issue dominated the Commission' s proceedings throughout
the Commissions existence. We sincerely hope that the
settlement of the plant closing notification issue, one of
the thorniest and longest standing issues dividing business
and labor in recent memory, clears the way for a new period
of business/ labor/community/government cooperation in the
development of a better economic climate and improved living
standards for the citizens of the Commonwealth.
Hopefully, the compact will result in businesses
voluntarily providing adequate notice or severence pay to
their workers. The main impetus to comply with the compact's
behavior standard seems to be moral pressure. Financial
pressures will work against a company complying. We will
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know more after some time in operation, but if the
Suplemental Unemployment Benefits fund gets large, it will be
because many companies are not cooperating with the compact.
It is extremely important, therefore, that the costs of this
fund be borne by the business community so that there is a
financial incentive as well as peer pressure to comply with
the compact. The use of beyond a short start-up period is not
appropriate.
Thfi Hfifid Eat An &&o.Qojoi£ Sltaicgy.
Beyond the plant closing issue, the Commission report
makes a number of recommendations that make it possible for
the state to address some basic problems before they get to
the crisis point. While these are good ideas, and their
implementation should not be delayed, they are not the
comprehensive approach that the Commonwealth needs.
Hopefully, with the plant closing Usue politically resolved,
at least for now, the creation of a more comprehensive
economic strategy for the Commonwealth can now move to the
top of the political agenda.
I believe that a coherent economic strategy is a needed
element for Massachusetts' s approach to economic development
in this increasingly competi tive world economy. Our state
has led the way over the past 8 years in the development of a
long list of innovative government programs to promote
economic growth. In the first Dukakis administration,
Massachusetts developed a model of broad-based economic
planning with a growth policy oriented to the revi t i 1 izat ion
of urban centers. We need something similar in the industrial
sphere so that our array of business incentive programs can
become more effective in creating good jobs and actually
improving the lives of people and their communities.
We need to adopt a clearly-stated set of goals for an
economic strategy that allows the Commonwealth to move beyond
ad hos. activity and case-by-case decision-making. Our
programs need more focus. We need to set priorities and
measure our progress toward achieving them. We need to
synthesize our many programs, agencies and tax incentives and
aim them at commonly -agreed upon economic goals. Arriving at
agreement on thesegoals will take another major investment in
consensus building among business, labor, communities and
government. And the development of this consensus will
demand leadership that looks beyond the special concerns of
the moment, and puts forth a vision of future progress for
the citizens of the Commonwealth.
What kind of goals could inform a state economic
strategy ? Some examples might include:
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1*. ln£££&&iug lilfi aY_£Lag£ WflLftfi*— One of the findings
of the Commission's work was that average wages in
Massachusetts are 3* below the national average, this while
the cost of living is way above average for much of the
state. A goal could be set to raise the average wage to, say,
5* above the national average. This would mean an increase
of $1300 per year in average wages. We might strive for this
goal by targeting assistance not simply to businesses which
create jobs, but to those that can pay above average wages.
In Rhode Island, for example, where a specific target for
increasing wages has been adopted, a new government
loan/grant program has been created to encourage jobs that
can pay $9 per hour or more.
I*, adducing wi£malQy.m£iii in aatiain l&Lgfil£d tfifciaoa^--
Eight of the Commonwealth's statistical Labor Market Areas
(LMAs) have unemployment rates from 9% to 14%. The many job
creation programs for the state could be prioritized so that
unemployment in these areas is reduced to some targeted
level
.
li. Dfi3Lfilo.pJ.ng l&Lt&lfisl sixalfigifia tat key. iadii&iLiea^--
The work that has been begun by the Commission shows some of
the basics on the competitive prospects for specific
industries. Different strategies lend themselves in
different situations. And different industries play
different roles in the state's economy. Some may be a source
of future strength; some we should expect to decline in
coming years. Because of the impact on its workforce and
communities, however, the Commowealth has an interest in
playing some role in seeing to it that its portfolio of
businesses is managed so that the common good is enhanced.
Specific targets might be set in terms of maintaining or
increasing market share in particular business segments.
Certainly other goals might be established as the result
of a consensus process. These are offered only as an example
of the kind of goals that might motivate an economic
strategy. The point is that goals such as these are
necessary to get maximum effectiveness out of government
programs, to measure progress and performance, and to enable
seperate interest groups to transcend their isolated
concerns
.
Once goals are agreed to, policies and programs aimed at
achieving them would need to utilize all sectors of the
economy, not just traditional manufacturing industries.
Focus on achieving these goals would make possible a more
rational and fundamental reevaluation of tax policies.
Massachusetts has a Tax Expenditure Budget for the first
time. An economic strategy is the way to help decide where
we can get the most return for our tax expenditures. The same
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is true for a needed review of our quasi-public financing
programs and job training efforts. An economic strategy
should include as a central feature the development of
coherent business strategies for geographic regions and
specific industries. A clearer game plan would enable the
state to establish them at the proper scale and make them
more effective. The lack of a strategy has meant that the
intial sizes for the programs our Commission has recommended
do not correspond to the scale of the problem they are
created to solve. The scale of the Economic Stabilization
Fund, the Product Development Fund, and initial staffing
levels for new state activities seem to have been set,
instead by political considerations— a sort of "f oot-in-the-
door" approach.
Without a coherent economic strategy, government efforts
become duplicative and burdened by unfocused incremental
changes. They begin to lack direction, have no clear
performance criteria, and lack accountability. With a
strategy— one that relies primarily on private businesses
and market forces— the role of government can be limited to
those activities where it is required.
An Euncilfi in Bhadfi Lil&ad
Perhaps Massachusetts can learn something in this regard
from the impressive effort at adopting a coherent economic
strategy just being created in Rhode Island. This program is
tied together with a short list of unifying goals aimed at
raising the anverage wage a specific amount, cutting
unemployment relative to the nation, and creating a specific
number of jobs. Certainly there are major differences between
Rhode Island and Massachusetts. Some of the recommendations
of the Rhode Island Strategic Development Commission have
been in place in Massachusetts for some time. Others are
being proposed now by our Commission report. Other major
elements of the RI approach, however, have not been seriously
discussed and need to be looked at.
This $250 million package of programs for a state one-
tenth the size of Massachusetts is aimed at a state economy
in much worse shape than our own. Certainly a comprehensive
strategy for Massachusetts would differ from theirs. And
yet, as our report shows, there are sections of
Massachusetts as large as Rhode Island when taken together
that face the same degree of economic crisis.
Our Commission has assembled much of the basic
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information needed to develop a clear economic strategy and
has begun to define the key issues. Unfortunately we just did
not have the opportunity to study our own data and findings
closely enough to take the next steps and put together a more
complete package. In some topic areas the Commission did not
have the resources or the mandate to assemble all the data
needed to develop an economic strategy. Hopefully the work
that has been done, together with the settlement of the plant
closing controversy, has laid the groundwork for the state to
get moving on a more complete approach.
I hope that the Governor will see fit to force the issue
on the creation of an economic strategy for Massachusetts.
There are any number of ways that he might go about it.
Perhaps the Industrial Advisory Board recommended by the
Commission would be an appropriate group to oversee the
effort. It is designed to represent the right constituency
groups. To be the right body however, it would have to be
specifically charged by the Governor to develop
a state economic strategy. Modest but adequate resources
must be allotted to the effort; a time frame for completing
work should be established; a formal document should be
presented to the Governor, the Legislature and the public.
Sincerely,
W~
osh Posner
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NORTON COMPANY womcmsTt* massacmhjsmtts o/eoe
ROBERTC VARNUM. JR.
VICC MMIOCNT
aoministnativc services May 31 , 1984
TO: Commission Co-Chairmen
I want to register my dissent to the "voluntary" compact, and I
would ask that the dissent be submitted as part of the final
commission report. I strongly disagree with the final paragraph
that calls for using public financing programs as a "stick" to
force business compliance. It is a negative statement in a document
where we tried to be positive. More important, it undermines our
credibility when we call the compact voluntary. It also implies
a lack of trust in the business community, and I think this will
be rightfully resented.
Thank you very much,
Robert C. Varnum, Jr.
JP
cc: Ben Kincannon
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VINCENT M. O'REILLY
oni post orncc souarc
oston. mass, oaios
June 11, 1984
Mr. Ronald Ansin
Co-chairman
Mr. George Carpenter
Co-chairman
Dr. Joseph Duffy
Co-chairman
Governor's Commission on the
Future of Mature Industries
Suite 602
100 Cambridge Street
Boston, MA 02202
Gentlemen:
I have the following general comments on the
May 25, 1984, draft of the report of the Commission:
1. Much of what is recommended in the
report applies equally to all employers
and employees in the Commonwealth. A
statement should be made to indicate
that the recommendations apply, to a
considerable extent, to all employers
and employees and not just for "mature
industries •" This same comment should
be repeated wherever the vehicles
recommended are similarly applicable to
the entire Massachusetts economy.
2. A better definition of mature industries
is needed. The definition should be
capable of standing the test of time and
changing circumstances. An approach
directed at the characteristics of an
industry, rather than specific
industrial sectors, might be a useful
tool for the future.
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Messrs. Ansin, Carpenter -2- June 11, 1984
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3. I have a strong private sector bias in
matters of allocation of resources.
Therefore, I recommend that:
(a) The funding or guarantees incor-
porated in any recommendations be
supplemental to, rather than in
place of, private sector capital.
This has the advantage of providing
continual input from the "market-
place" and will allow better
decisions to be made. Additionally,
it will reduce the amount of staff
work and analyses needed by any
public agencies created as a result
of the Commission's work, since
private sector analyses can be
assumed to precede any application
to the Commonwealth and commitment
by it.
(b) Rigorous "return on investment"
objectives should be established
before any funds are disbursed.
Such objectives must establish a
minimum level of cash return because
of the revolving pool concept
implicit in the recommendations.
Other objectives, such a job
preservation, should be quantified
in advance and performance measured
thereafter.
(c) The Commonwealth should obtain the
right to participate in any
"windfall" profits which might
accrue to any investee company via a
future public offering or sale of
the company. This technique is
particularly equitable in those
situations where the Commonwealth
enchanced the viability of the
company by its actions.
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4. I believe that any mechanisms estab-
lished to prevent an economic
dislocation and/or cushion its effect,
should be restricted to significant
situations. Therefore, the Commission's
recommendations should deal only with
major closings, with major being defined
to encompass not only numbers of
employees (which usually should be much
higher than fifty), but more
importantly, percentages of employees
related to the number of jobs and the
then unemployed in the geographic area.
Por example, the closing of a plant in
greater Boston which creates 300
unemployed workers is a much less
serious situation than a closing which
creates 300 unemployed in a smaller,
more remote, area of the Commonwealth.
5. The recommendations need to be supported
by an extensive cost benefit analysis
with significant detail so that the
Commission members and any readers of
the report can better understand the
investments required and the benefits
expected. I realize that in some
instances we may need to define the
return on investment in terms which go
beyond simply economic profit to
encompass such things as job creation or
retention, but I believe it is possible
to create an analysis framework which is
measurable. This concept of measura-
bility is important both in the creation
of new vehicles and the review of their
performance.
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6. If the industrial advisory board concept
is implemented, the goal should be to
keep the Industrial Advisory Board small
and representative of the Massa-
chusetts economy. There is, to my mind,
a need to avoid a large, cumbersome
Board which has so many members that it
becomes difficult to get anything done.
It is vital that this Board insures that
decisions made by the Massachusetts
Industrial Service are based on economic
considerations rather than political
expediency.
7. There are few companies on the brink of
closing that can be saved. We should
not set up an expectation that the
Industrial Service can or should try to
save a majority of such companies. It
has been my experience that very special
skills are necessary to be effective in
helping troubled companies and that
harsh actions are usually necessary with
respect to some or a major piece of the
business in order to save part of it.
Finally, I believe that the primary role
of the Industrial Service is to serve as
a catalyst and a clearinghouse and that,
in all instances, it will work in tandem
with the private sector, particularly
where it comes to financing.
8. I strongly object to the process by
. which the Massachusetts APL-CIO was
specifically named as a member of the
Industrial Advisory Board. In all prior
drafts of the Commission's report,
reference was made to representatives of
labor. I am not aware of any dis-
cussions at the Commission's meetings
regarding the designation of a specific
organization. Therefore, I find it
difficult to support the naming of a
specific organization in the final
report as a Commission recommendation
when the opportunity for discussion was
never given.
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8. (Continued)
I object to the specific naming of one
organization in the Commission's report,
just as I would object to the naming of
a specific business organization as a
permanent member of the Industrial
Advisory Board. The Massachusetts AFL-
CIO does not represent all labor unions
nor all of labor within Massachusetts.
I believe that there needs to be
flexibility and the avoidance of the
mandated representation of one
organization.
9. We have drifted from the relatively
simple idea of a Social Compact that we
originally addressed which was to
outline some general concept of employer
responsibility. The draft, as presently
exists, has reference to a number of
topics which are explained in great
detail in the Commission's report and
does not contain precise definitions.
If we want something that people can
sign, it should be very simple and
self-contained and not require reference
to other documents or future
definitions.
The most troubling aspect of the
Compact, to my mind, consists of the
concept that funding from quasi-public
finance agencies would be exclusively
for signatory firms. While I have
philosophical objections to this
particular technique, I believe that the
concept is impractical. If our goal is
to promote and retain jobs within
Massachusetts, then I cannot see
realistically how the Commonwealth would
deny assistance to a troubled firm or
assistance to a new employer in the
Commonwealth simply on the basis of
non-signature of the Compact.
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9. (Continued)
If there is a non-signing viable
troubled firm in the Commonwealth, it
should be helped because jobs will be
preserved' whether or not the employer
has signed the Compact. Similarly, if a
company new to Massachusetts is willing
to provide jobs to Massachusetts
citizens on the basis that quasi-public
assistance is provided to it, then I do
not see too much sense in jeoparidzing
such jobs, if the prospective employer
has some philosophical or other objec-
tions to signing the Compact.
The balance of this letter will address
specific comments on the draft report and the draft
of the Compact. In all cases my comments refer to
the May 25, 1984, draft.
The second paragraph of Page 34 of the rec-
ommendations establishes a standard that I fear that
is too rigorous to achieve in all cases . The term
"comparable jobs" is used. I would suggest that we
use some lesser standard such as "adequate
employment" because in many instances an older worker
may not be able to get a comparable job, particularly
in his or her community of residence.
The product development fund is an interest-
ing idea, but a better statement of purpose is
necessary. This definition of purpose should serve
as an effective screen to use to see if the projects
presented meet the criteria. There also needs to be
some definition of the return on investment which is
contemplated by such a fund.
This vehicle could potentially put the
Commonwealth in the awkward position of financing one
resident company to the disadvantage of another.
Solutions to this problem must be found prior to
implementation.
101
Messrs. Ansin, Carpenter -7- June 11, 1984
and Dr. Duffy
I disagree with the concept which would have
the Commonwealth look only to the product under
development for its return. 1 would recommend that
any advances under this concept be secured by
business and personal assets of the investee to the
extent that they are available. We also have to be
careful about definitions in the implementation of
this concept so that such things as measurement,
success of product development, etc., are clearly
stipulated.
Finally, I would recommend that the product
development fund be a closed pool. This is not
inconsistent with a grading up of the funding from an
initial capitalization of $2 Million, but I strongly
believe that there should be a cap and performance
measured annually on a return basis.
Z believe that the goal of the Commonwealth
level assistance capability should be, in most
instances, that of a catalyst or a clearinghouse. I
am a bit troubled with the concept of the
Commonwealth "providing engineers with special
expertise in production to consult with companies of
technological changes..." This is fine as long as it
is a catalyst or clearinghouse function, but I would
be opposed to the establishment of a consulting type
firm within the Commonwealth structure.
The stabilization fund probably needs some
more definition. It is not clear whether the
activities contemplated consist simply of bridge
financing until permanent financing can be arranged
or whether a more permanent type of financing is
contemplated. My recommendation would be that the
stabilisation fund be supplemental to private sector
funds for the reasons previously outlined.
Additionally, I believe that this stabilization fund
should operate on a revolving basis so that the
proceeds from the liquidation of previous investments
are used to fund new investments. My previous
comments on the applicability of such a mechanism to
more than mature industries, the need for a clearly
established return on investment criteria which is
measurable, both as a screen for investments and to
appraise performance, are applicable.
102
Messrs. Ansin, Carpenter -8- June 11, 1984
and Dr. Duffy
I strongly object to the concept that the
directors of the stabilization fund should not bear
any personal financial liability for their actions.
I believe that the directors should have the same
type of responsibility that the directors of any
venture capital fund would normally have.
Additionally, I believe that the board should be
small.
The statewide monitoring capability is a
good idea, but it should remain cognizant of and
cooperate with private and university economic
studies.
I believe that there is a need to have
substantial study of the entire area of training so
that there can be a better matching of costs and
benefits. I do not believe myself to be sufficiently
informed, based upon the Commission's work, to make
any specific recommendations other than a strong
sense on my part that there is the need for a study.
I will be happy to provide additional
commentary, if it would be helpful.
Sincerely,
(//Mj^t M'<
Vincent M. O'Reilly
VMO'R:gdo
cc: Mr. B. P. Kincannon
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We generally support the Commission's recommendations involving improving the
climate for the creation of new enterprises and for increased government assis-
tance to workers displaced by plant closings.
However, we oppose those recommendations (e.g. the proposed New Product Develop-
ment Fund) that provide public funds to assist failing but "potentially viable"
companies and industries. Such proposals constitute an industrial policy that
substitutes political judgement for market judgement.
Since market judgement will ultimately prevail, public funds used
to subsidize failing companies are a Waste of precious tax revenues.
The subsidies are in general targeted at companies that have proven
to be among the least viable. The proposals may reward failure.
To give public funds to one company and not to its competitor (s) is
unfair
.
There is no way of insulating the distribution of funds from political
influence. The determination that a given company is or is not poten-
tially viable will inevitably be based on the number of employees
affected and the bargaining power of the business and political leaders
involved — none of which has anything to do with the essential viability
of the company. The knowledge necessary to determine the viability of
the firm, as well as the responsibility and accountability for its per-
formance, must be presumed to lie with the company's management and
its board of directors. This premi se~is so fundamental to our free-
enterprise system that we cannot support any proposals that contradict
it.
In defining the composition of various boards and commissions, the report uses
the generic terms "business" and "government," but uses the specific term
"AFL-CIO," apparently as a synonym for workers. We find this wholly unacceptable,
just as the use of "AIM" or "High Tech Council" would be inappropriate in place
of "business" or "The Dukakis Administration" in place of "government." The
AFL-CIO speaks for well under 20 percent of the workers in this State, and it
is irrational to suggest that the vast majority of workers, who have no affilia-
tion with this union; should be represented by it on government commissions.
We also take exception to the use of coercion in the "voluntary" compact. In
our view, a compact is not voluntary if its acceptance is a precondition for
access to otherwise available public services. We believe that our proposals
of voluntary Appropriate Responsible Action for employers faced with massive
dislocation of employment serve best to minimize disruption to workers, their
families, and their communities.
C. A. McKay ^Z^^-y ^J^ Van v£££ <-^-fc-
Executive Vice President Vice President 1.^- ^
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